Epstein Secrets

ecutive; secretary of labor (1969-70); director of the Office of Management and Budget (1970-72); secretary of the Treasury (1972-74); chairman of Ronald Reagan's economic transition team; and the secretary of state (1982-89) who wound down the Cold War. He's also been an active adviser to GOP leaders includi

nomy can be turned around because I watched Ronald Reagan do it." "It took long-term thinking," Mr. Shultz emphasizes. "I'll give you an example. [Reagan] knew and we all advised him you can't have a decent economy with the kind of inflation we've got. . . . The political people would come in and say

Hassan, director of the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies. "But there is no political will." Instead, he says, when the topic of reforming the Interior Ministry was raised in the now dissolved Parliament, the Brotherhood seemed to focus solely on substituting pro-Islamists for officers who persecuted them u

s series of air attacks, on August 12, when the deal was basically done, seemed both perverse and excessive, and not just to me. Habib, and President Reagan himself, fumed. So did a lot of Begin’s own ministers, with the result, unprecedented in Israeli military annals, that they formally removed Arik’s a

rse and excessive, and not just to me. Habib, and President Reagan himself, fumed. So did a lot of Begin’s own minis

lked through how to get my voice heard. I telephoned Yoni Koren, the officer who’d been my top aide in the kirva and whom I'd asked to work for me in the Interior Ministry, assuming I now actually got there. I told him to phone Amnon Lipkin and say that I had expected him to answer the fabrications. Not only had he and

s series of air attacks, on August 12, when the deal was basically done, seemed both perverse and excessive, and not just to me. Habib, and President Reagan himself, fumed. So did a lot of Begin's own ministers, with the result, unprecedented in Israeli military annals, that they formally removed Arik's a

rse and excessive, and not just to me. Habib, and President Reagan himself, fumed. So did a lot of Begin's own minis

lked through how to get my voice heard. I telephoned Yoni Koren, the officer who'd been my top aide in the kirya and whom I'd asked to work for me in the Interior Ministry, assuming I now actually got there. I told him to phone Amnon Lipkin and say that I had expected him to answer the fabrications. Not only had he and

ir impor- tance) that had been provided to Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. Even more s

n prepared in Moscow had been incorporated into reports (which had a distinctive blue stripe to signify their impor- tance) that had been provided to Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton. Even more shocking, in tracing the path of this disinformation, the inspector general found that the “senior CI

ssia. He then told him that he represented a group of disillusioned officials in Russia that included key members of the secret police, the army, and the Interior Ministry. Yakushev said that they all had come to the same conclusion: the Communist experiment in Russia had totally failed and needed to be replaced. To eff