Epstein Secrets

ained to end the violence if possible, not make it worse. When Clinton asked me to join him, Arafat, King Abdullah of Jordan and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for a summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, I agreed. We worked out a series of steps to disengage. Arafat was finally supposed to order the Palestinian Authori

Abdullah of Jordan and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for a summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, I agreed. We wor

test prospect of movement on Oslo. In October, Bibi did finally try to seize the initiative. He wrapping up the redeployment details in a summit with Arafat and Clinton and Arafat in Wye River. But as soon as he got back home, he started backtracking, rather than risk facing down his right-wing critics in

attraction in getting a deal with Syria first: it would increase our negotiating leverage with the Palestinians. That would certainly not be lost on Yasir Arafat — one reason that I realized the importance of an early meeting with him, to convey my commitment to keeping the Oslo process alive, and, if possible

Abdullah of Jordan and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for a summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, I agreed. We wor

ained to end the violence if possible, not make it worse. When Clinton asked me to join him, Arafat, King Abdullah of Jordan and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan for a summit in Sharm al-Sheikh, I agreed. We worked out a series of steps to disengage. Arafat was finally supposed to order the Palestinian Authori

test prospect of movement on Oslo. In October, Bibi did finally try to seize the initiative. He wrapping up the redeployment details in a summit with Arafat and Clinton and Arafat in Wye River. But as soon as he got back home, he started backtracking, rather than risk facing down his right-wing critics in

54 Chapter Twenty-One President Clinton and I met the next morning. My aim was to persuade him that the time had come for a make-or-break summit with Yasir Arafat. I suspected it would not be easy to convince him, and it wasn't. But I made the argument that if we were to have any hope of moving Oslo forward, we

the fighting will continue to fail. UN envoy Kofi Annan's efforts are increasingly out of touch with rea

ot be diverted by negotiations. The situation is becoming rapidly worse, and diplomatic efforts to end the fighting will continue to fail. UN envoy Kofi Annan's efforts are increasingly out of touch with realities on the ground, giving the regime a fig leaf of legitimacy and time in which to break the oppos

aking nine-month investigation by the Doha-based al-Jazeera TV, it was proven that high levels of the deadly radioactive polonium 210 were found in Yasser Arafat's effects. The poison avoids detection unless specifically searched for at a laboratory, explaining why nobody noticed it back in 2004. Two years aft

al were registered as "unknown". This was strange - to say the least - for a man of his age. Israeli papers occasionally came out with reports that Arafat died of AIDS, EFTA00701843 while Palestinians of different strips and colors insisted that their former president had been murdered. For years, t

he fighting will continue to fail. UN envoy Kofi Annan's efforts are increasingly out of touch with rea

ot be diverted by negotiations. The situation is becoming rapidly worse, and diplomatic efforts to end the fighting will continue to fail. UN envoy Kofi Annan's efforts are increasingly out of touch with realities on the ground, giving the regime a fig leaf of legitimacy and time in which to break the oppo

aking nine-month investigation by the Doha-based al-Jazeera TV, it was proven that high levels of the deadly radioactive polonium 210 were found in Yasser Arafat's effects. The poison avoids detection unless specifically searched for at a laboratory, explaining why nobody noticed it back in 2004. Two years af

l were registered as "unknown". This was strange - to say the least - for a man of his age. Israeli papers occasionally came out with reports that Arafat died of AIDS, while Palestinians of different strips and colors insisted that their former president had been murdered. For years, the world scoff

iplomatic approach to both countries. But if regime change in Syria is the goal, Security Council resolutions and six-point plans from the likes of Kofi Annan are doomed to failure. Only a E FTA_R1_02204140 EFTA02720611 combination of economic and military pressure, by Assad's opposition or outsiders,

Obama is seeking a bargain. So it's no wonder Tehran sought to add Syria to the topics for discussion at the last session of negotiations — or that Annan wants to include Iran in a new "contact group" to broker a settlement in Syria. The Obama administration rejected both proposals — because they ar

k the first steps to withdraw its forces and settlers from Palestinian territories. Despairing of any possibility for productive negotiations while Yasir Arafat led the PLO, but under heavy pressure to make some move, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon turned to Gaza, which the old general viewed as a military bu

Syrian people. Everything we know about Putin suggests that he will never acquiesce in a popular uprising against an authoritarian government. The Annan mission is plainly futile, except in making us complicit with the Russian plan to thwart concerted action against the Syrian atrocities; and Annan

. PASF veterans appeared more concerned with maintaining access to power and personal wealth from the traditionally corrupt avenues established by Arafat. Israelis, on the other hand, remained intent on achieving improved security largely through unilateral means as they had always done. The result w

. Abbas's Palestinian Authority was in disarray following the end of the brutal Second Intifada, the chaotic security situation after the death of Yasir Arafat, and the unsure political and security wake of Israel's historic disengagement from Gaza. Meanwhile, the security relationship between the IDF an

ement) (28 September 1995) 145 Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH Agreement) (9 May 1996) 324 Declaration by PM Netanyahu and Chairman Arafat following their first meeting (4 September 1996) 327 Hebron Protocol (17 January 1997) 329 Note for the Record (17 January 1997) 336 HOUSE_OVERSIGH

a pariah for several essential players and was isolated in his Muqata headquarters in Ramallah. Under these dire circumstances, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a meeting in the conference room of his executive office at United Nations’ Headquarters in New York with the US, Russia, and the European

ese dire circumstances, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for a meeting in the conference room of hi