Epstein Secrets

as a consultant—along with, he points out, Paul Volcker.) But the characterization persist: if it's not

n Hoffenberg, briefly a New York high flyer, who went to jail for a Ponzi scheme, for whom Epstein acted as a consultant—along with, he points out, Paul Volcker.) But the characterization persist: if it's not clear, it must be murky. Sure, Goldman Sachs partners and tech geniuses, they might have stratosphe

e-like terms backwards, as in who has gotten it, but forwards to where it will go and who will get it." Epstein can find himself echoing aspects of Thomas Piketty on the inequities of the accumulation of wealth ("the divide is between people with assets, which appreciate, and people without assets, who fail t

ance—that is, of course, the miracle of compounded interest"), except for the fact that Epstein, knowing the rich, understands a curious point that Piketty doesn't: "Nobody, nobody, wants to give it all to their children. Everybody now has the modern appreciation that one of the curses of great wealth

behind the taxing power is the total capital of the nation, meaning human as well as physical capital. And the dollar has proved pretty stable since Paul Volker’s tough reforms in the early 1980s. That means that government fiat money in this county is working about as well as anything we have known. But th

t cherry-picked to support Mill’s idea. They are all | have found. My source for national accounts including market-valued capital was the website of Thomas Piketty and Gabriel Zucman adjusting their data to uniform accounting standards and measuring them in 2010 currency units. It also collects recent and past r

in the 1920s and reorganized them along Keynesian lines when the General Theory was published, reconstructed them back to 1870 for the U.S. economy. Piketty and Zucman incorporate this research and others. They have acted as editors only. As a layman, I would hardly be qualified to find and interpret orig

Macroeconomics 2/8/16 17 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011106 Price stability can matter. The United States has managed to avoid double-digit inflation since the Volker reforms of the 1980s. But the danger remains. Modigliani was right to worry. A law making real dollars legal tender might prompt better measurement

estment. My charts and tables will never be exact. There are inevitably errors and judgment biases in the national accounts and research assembled by Piketty and Zucman, more added by them, and more by me. These cautions will apply to later chapters as well. Chapter 4 Mill’s Idea 1/11/16 28 HOUSE_OVERSI

te-like terms backwards, as in who has gotten it, but forwards to where it will go and who will get it.” Epstein can find himself echoing aspects of Thomas Piketty on the inequities of the accumulation of wealth (“the divide is between people with assets, which appreciate, and people without assets, who fail to

ail to advance—that is, of course, the miracle of compounded interest”), except for the fact that Epstein, knowing the rich, understands a point that Piketty doesn’t: “Nobody, nobody, wants to give it all to their children. Everybody now has the modern appreciation that one of the curses of great wealth is

d as a consultant—along with, he points out, Paul Volcker.) But the characterization persists: if it’s not

ven Hoffenberg, briefly a New York high flyer, who went to jail for a Ponzi scheme, for whom Epstein acted as a consultant—along with, he points out, Paul Volcker.) But the characterization persists: if it’s not clear, it must be murky. Sure, Goldman Sachs partners and tech geniuses, they might have stratospher

te-like terms backwards, as in who has gotten it, but forwards to where it will go and who will get it.” Epstein can find himself echoing aspects of Thomas Piketty on the inequities of the accumulation of wealth (“the divide is between people with assets, which appreciate, and people without assets, who fail to

vance— that is, of course, the miracle of compounded interest”), except for the fact that Epstein, knowing the rich, understands a curious point that Piketty doesn’t: “Nobody, nobody, wants to give it all to their children. Everybody now has the modern appreciation that one of the curses of great wealth is

ven Hoffenberg, briefly a New York high flyer, who went to jail for a Ponzi scheme, for whom Epstein acted as a consultant—along with, he points out, Paul Volcker.) But the characterization persist: if it’s not clear, 1t must be murky. Sure, Goldman Sachs partners and tech geniuses, they might have stratospheri

d as a consultant—along with, he points out, Paul Volcker.) But the characterization persist: if it’s not c

te-like terms backwards, as in who has gotten it, but forwards to where it will go and who will get it.” Epstein can find himself echoing aspects of Thomas Piketty on the inequities of the accumulation of wealth (“the divide is between people with assets, which appreciate, and people without assets, who fail to

dvance—that is, of course, the miracle of compounded interest”), except for the fact that Epstein, knowing the rich, understands a curious point that Piketty doesn’t: “Nobody, nobody, wants to give it all to their children. Everybody now has the modern appreciation that one of the curses of great wealth is

ven Hoffenberg, briefly a New York high flyer, who went to jail for a Ponzi scheme, for whom Epstein acted as a consultant—along with, he points out, Paul Volcker.) But the characterization persist: if it’s not clear, it must be murky. Sure, Goldman Sachs partners and tech geniuses, they might have stratospheri

d as a consultant—along with, he points out, Paul Volcker.) But the characterization persist: if it’s not c

te-like terms backwards, as in who has gotten it, but forwards to where it will go and who will get it.” Epstein can find himself echoing aspects of Thomas Piketty on the inequities of the accumulation of wealth (“the divide is between people with assets, which appreciate, and people without assets, who fail to

ail to advance—that is, of course, the miracle of compounded interest”), except for the fact that Epstein, knowing the rich, understands a point that Piketty doesn’t: “Nobody, nobody, wants to give it all to their children. Everybody now has the modern appreciation that one of the curses of great wealth is

ven Hoffenberg, briefly a New York high flyer, who went to jail for a Ponzi scheme, for whom Epstein acted as a consultant—along with, he points out, Paul Volcker.) But the characterization persists: if it’s not clear, it must be murky. Sure, Goldman Sachs partners and tech geniuses, they might have stratospher

d as a consultant—along with, he points out, Paul Volcker.) But the characterization persists: if it’s not