Epstein Secrets

ded version. Even if one were to argue that the statute is "civil" and the damages thereunder are "civil" in nature, under the analysis provided by the United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Products 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994), pertaining to civil statutes, not only is there no express intent by Congress

fficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.O. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322. We have recognized in such cases that `a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of

e, Defendant's position as to the meaning of the statute would prevail. See United States v. Santos 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008). As summarized by the United States Supreme Court in Santos, supra, at 2025: 5 See argument in sections (2) and (3) that follow which represent the predicate for the rule of lenity issue discussed

fficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322. We have recognized in such cases that `a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of

e, Defendant's position as to the meaning of the statute would prevail. See United States v. Santos 128 S.Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008). As summarized by the United States Supreme Court in Santos, supra, at 2025: 5 See argument in sections (2) and (3) that follow which represent the predicate for the rule of lenity issue discussed

fficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.' Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322. We have recognized in such cases that `a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of