Epstein Secrets

accept the two-state solution, with an Israeli and Palestinian state, they know that Abbas did not deviate much from the principles that began with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)'s `Ten Point Program' or the `Phased Plan' in the mid-seventies, which culminated in the Madrid Conference of 1991 and then the Oslo Accords

of us, knows how weak the Palestinians are. Abbas also knows that the Gaza-West Bank split is much more than a "brotherly" misunderstanding between Fatah and Hamas. The world has been preoccupied away from Palestinian concerns, and now, the Arabs themselves are preoccupied away from Palestine with th

hat makes little sense to anyone other than Hamas operatives; or to rejoin and reconfigure Palestinian national institutions EFTA00719584 such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, to continue the struggle nationally and regionally. This raises the third level of analysis of Hamas' decision, which relates to the condition of

0719574 the appeal of internationalizing the conflict mean there are few political incentives for flexibility toward Israel. Divisions between the Fatah and Hamas factions complicate matters: Their recent agreement is paper-thin and highlights that, for now, Palestinians are focused more on immediat

ent that exercises authority in the West Bank, is committed to the Quartet principles and the Arab Peace Initiative and respects the commitments of the Palestine Liberation Organization. • Call for both states to engage in good faith negotiations on the basis of this and previous relevant resolutions and agreements in order to res

mer than ever, and the looser tunnel patrols in Egypt mean greater access to weapons as well. But opinion surveys show that its more secular rival, Fatah, is more popular. That may explain why an attempt at political unity with Fatah is moving slowly: the Hamas leaders here are likely to lose their

inian statelet that makes litt=e sense to anyone other than Hamas operatives; or to rejoin and reconfigure Palestinian national institutions=such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, to continue the struggle na=ionally and regionally. This raises the thi=d level of analysis of Hamas' decision, which relates to the condition o=

od. Sooner or later, the plan cou=d be revived, coupled with an Israeli military presence in the Jordan Vall=y to minimize risks of a Gazan repeat. Fatah and the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority have a long-term object=ve that differs markedly from Israel's: a state enjoying full sovereign =ights

on the agenda of Benjamin Netanyahu, whose reelection campaign is premised on the belief that Israel has no Palestinian partner. But dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization was once deemed unthinkable, too, and over time Israelis leaders realized that since they could not destroy the PLO militarily, they were better o

ders himself the holder of a diplomatic passport. You have a password that opens all doors." Jonathan Schanzer, author of the 2008 book "Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine," said Qassam has had four distinct phases. The first was a single-minded focus on suicide bombings, until Yahya Ayyas

is latest signed document may face the same fate. The rival movements have to negotiate the terms of complex power sharing and the restructuring of the Palestine Liberation Organization, from which Hamas has been excluded. It remained unclear how some of the Hamas leaders in Gaza, who are destined to lose their jobs in the new arr

Netanyahu warning Mr. Abbas that he could have peace with Israel or unity with Hamas, but not both. The agreement between Mr. Abbas, the leader of Fatah, and Khaled Meshal, the head of Hamas, was yet another convulsion in the Middle East involving the rise of political Islam and the challenge it po

r prisoner in Israel who also hails from the West Bank. EFTA00711879 A second, and more intriguing, option: Meshaal could seek the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a first step toward melding Fatah with Hamas to create a new united Palestinian movement. With its chief Mahmoud Abbas anxious to throw in the t

t become the kind of full-scale revolts that hit Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria. But there is a growing sense that the leaderships of both Fatah (in charge in the West Bank) and Hamas (which controls Gaza) have lost much of their legitimacy. Mired in corruption and addicted to repression, ne

lestine PLC Palestinian Legislative Council PLO Palestine Liberation Organization SLA South Lebanon Army TIPH Temporary Internati

hartoum Resolution of the three ‘Noes’. 22 November 1967 UN Security Council Resolution 242. 21 March 1968 The battle of Karameh between Israel and Fatah and Jordanian forces. First direct military confrontation between Israeli and Palestinian forces. 17 July 1968 The Palestinian National Charter. HOU

emerged stronger politically from the recent clash with Israel and continues to reject the Jewish state's right to exist. Hamas and its secular rival Fatah are due to meet Saturday as part of a reconciliation process. If an agreement is reached and Hamas joins the Palestinian Authority, Obama will be fac

t way to solve our differences: Let our people decide, those in Palestine as well as our people in the Diaspora. Having said so, Hamas has recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, including its mandate to negotiate a final status agreement with Israel. Once th

emerged stronger politically from the recent clash with Israel and continues to reject the Jewish state's right to exist. Hamas and its secular rival Fatah are due to meet Saturday as part of a reconciliation process. If an agreement is reached and Hamas joins the Palestinian Authority, Obama will be fac

t way to solve our differences: Let our people decide, those in Palestine as well as our people in the Diaspora. Having said so, Hamas has recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, including its mandate to negotiate a final status agreement with Israel. Once th