Epstein Secrets

ons of dollars to strengthen Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein. Today, militant Islamist organizations s

dollars to strengthen Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein. Today, militant Islamist organizations such as

military action against Assad to remove him from power. These were the same two voices that lobbied the Clinton and Bush administrations to topple Saddam Hussein's regime. When the United States did exactly as these senators advocated, countless unintended negative consequences ensued. Such outcomes could be e

aunch nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. The Israeli nuclear arsenal is a triad—it can launch nuclear war from American-built F-15s, the French-origin Jericho missile and German-built Dolphin-class U-boats. It has a survivable second-strike capability and can project power far beyond its immediate environ

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up — minus the “well-off family” part. 232 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011703 When we got to Hussein’s country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain’s military academy in S

ortant to press ahead with the opening phase of the handover of Israeli authority mapped out by Oslo. In May 1994, a draft of the so-called “Gaza and Jericho First” agreement was completed. Once it was ratified, the five-year interim period would begin, with further withdrawals and parallel negotiations on

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our i

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up - minus the "well-off family" part. 232 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028080 When we got to Hussein's country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain's military academy in S

ortant to press ahead with the opening phase of the handover of Israeli authority mapped out by Oslo. In May 1994, a draft of the so-called "Gaza and Jericho First" agreement was completed. Once it was ratified, the five-year interim period would begin, with further withdrawals and parallel negotiations on

ayel. 17 September 1982 UN Security Council Resolution 520 (Lebanon). 17 May 1983 Israel and Lebanon sign a peace agreement. 19 February 1986 King Hussein of Jordan severs ties with the PLO. 11 April 1987 London Agreement. 21 May 1987 Lebanon’s parliament abrogates the 1969 Cairo agreement with the PL

otocol on Economic Relations between the State of Israel and the PLO (Paris Protocol). Gaza-Jericho Agreement. The IDF withdraws from Gaza city and Jericho. Yasir Arafat arrives in Gaza. Washington Declaration (Jordan-Israel peace talks). Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Power and Responsibilities.

he PLO had been financially dependent on the states of the Arab Gulf and the Communist bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991 resulted in the collapse of funding for the PLO and an end to remittances to Palestinian families in Gaza and the West Ba

lapse of the Soviet Union and Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991 resulted in t

ique figure -- neither a fighter (no nom de guerre for him), nor a PLO insider, nor an organization man from Tunis. Rather, he was a West Banker from Jericho, and he succeeded in maintaining his relevance in a Palestinian HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029698 --- PAGE BREAK --- political scene dominated not by fellow a

990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we

en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to

. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam

ique figure -- neither a fighter (no nom de guerre for him), nor a PLO insider, nor an organization man from Tunis. Rather, he was a West Banker from Jericho, and he succeeded in maintaining his relevance in a Palestinian HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_029785 --- PAGE BREAK --- political scene dominated not by fellow a

990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we

en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to

. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam