Epstein Secrets

the regime." Pillar says the theory has some historical evidence on its side. "The big data point in support of this concept is the Iran-Iraq war: Saddam Hussein's Iraq attacking Iran," he says. "Iraq was the aggressor, and the attack [had] a big rally-around-the-flag effect and it had a positive effect in bol

in support of this concept is the Iran-Iraq war: Saddam Hussein's Iraq attacking Iran," he says. "Iraq w

ort of this concept is the Iran-Iraq war: Saddam Hussein's Iraq attacking Iran," he says. "Iraq was the ag

nsufficiently demure, and demanding that women sit at the back of public buses. Elyakim Levanon, the chief rabbi of the Elon Moreh settlement, near Nablus, says that Orthodox soldiers should prefer to face a "firing squad" rather than sit through events at which women sing, and has forbidden women to

cts until Ankara signed a water agreement with the states below it. The United States' invasion of Iraq in 2003 changed all that. The toppling of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent empowerment of Iraqi Shias instilled a fear in the kingdom that Saudi's own Shia population would agitate for change. Beyond th

f Iraq in 2003 changed all that. The toppling of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent empowerment of Iraqi

in 2003 changed all that. The toppling of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent empowerment of Iraqi Shias in

on the ground. This burgeoning trust paid off in initial Palestinian security campaigns to get militias off the streets in the West Bank cities of Nablus and Jenin. These nascent campaigns were marked examples of bold Palestinian security initiatives and the IDF's newfound willingness to support the

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up — minus the “well-off family” part. 232 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011703 When we got to Hussein’s country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain’s military academy in S

the end of 1998, the Palestinian death toll was above 300. In February 1989, an Israeli officer was killed by a cement block tossed from a rooftop in Nablus. A month later, a Palestinian knifed several people in Tel Aviv, killing one of them. And in July, in the first attempt inside Israel at a suicide at

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our i

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up - minus the "well-off family" part. 232 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028080 When we got to Hussein's country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain's military academy in S

the end of 1998, the Palestinian death toll was above 300. In February 1989, an Israeli officer was killed by a cement block tossed from a rooftop in Nablus. A month later, a Palestinian knifed several people in Tel Aviv, killing one of them. And in July, in the first attempt inside Israel at a suicide at

alem not } ee presented by the Israeli side - e ; Nablus». a * 98 coed Israeli settlement a: . $a Qalqiliy

ayel. 17 September 1982 UN Security Council Resolution 520 (Lebanon). 17 May 1983 Israel and Lebanon sign a peace agreement. 19 February 1986 King Hussein of Jordan severs ties with the PLO. 11 April 1987 London Agreement. 21 May 1987 Lebanon’s parliament abrogates the 1969 Cairo agreement with the PL

he PLO had been financially dependent on the states of the Arab Gulf and the Communist bloc. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991 resulted in the collapse of funding for the PLO and an end to remittances to Palestinian families in Gaza and the West Ba

lapse of the Soviet Union and Arafat’s support of Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War of 1991 resulted in t

n label Peres in his memoirs as "an indefatigable intriguer." In 1975, while Rabin was doing his utmost to prevent the settlement of Elon Moreh, near Nablus, Peres continuously sabotaged his efforts. After no less than eight settlement attempts, which were ruled illegal by Israel's Supreme Court, a "compr

990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we

en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to

. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam

n label Peres in his memoirs as "an indefatigable intriguer." In 1975, while Rabin was doing his utmost to prevent the settlement of Elon Moreh, near Nablus, Peres continuously sabotaged his efforts. After no less than eight settlement attempts, which were ruled illegal by Israel's Supreme Court, a "compr

990. When faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear we

en faced with a build-up of Iraqi forces along its border, Kuwait decided not to mobilize its military out of fear that the move would provoke Saddam Hussein. The incentives for Gulf states to make similar strategic calculations in the future will be greater when Iran has an inventory of nuclear weapons to

. One of the great strategic lessons drawn from the long history of conflict in the Middle East is this: Do not go to war without nuclear weapons, as Saddam Hussein did when he invaded Kuwait. The corollary is: Do not allow the United States to methodically build-up forces in the Gulf prior to invading, as Saddam