Epstein Secrets

1981, when we'd launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein's 402 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028250 / BARAK /

hen we'd launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein's 402 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028250 / BARAK / 117 reac

s arrived on site and it could begin producing bomb-ready material. Just as under Menachem Begin in 1981, when we'd launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein's 402 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028250 / BARAK / 117 reactor near Baghdad, there was never any question that we would take any and all possible measures to pre

to know Olmert fairly well over the years, initially when I was in the kirya and both he and another rising Likud politician to whom I became closer, Dan Meridor, were members of the Knesset's defense committee. But from the day I returned to the Israeli government in June 2007, there was growing tension betwe

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up — minus the “well-off family” part. 232 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011703 When we got to Hussein’s country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain’s military academy in S

oreign Minister David Levy; Ariye Deri, the leader of the Sephardi Orthodox party Shas; and two 235 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011706 young Likud politicians, Dan Meridor and Ehud Olmert, with whom I had become friendly. They, like me, were concerned about undermining the Americans’ military and diplomatic coalition.

s arrived on site and it could begin producing bomb-ready material. Just as under Menachem Begin in 1981, when we’d launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein’s 402 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011873 / BARAK / 117 reactor near Baghdad, there was never any question that we would take any and all possible measures to pr

1981, when we’d launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein’s 402 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011873 / BARAK /

hen we’d launched our preemptive strike on Saddam Hussein’s 402 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011873 / BARAK / 117 rea

to know Olmert fairly well over the years, initially when I was in the kirya and both he and another rising Likud politician to whom I became closer, Dan Meridor, were members of the Knesset’s defense committee. But from the day I returned to the Israeli government in June 2007, there was growing tension betwe

reports in the weeks after the training accident made secrecy impossible. We were planning to infiltrate a Sayeret Matkal unit into Iraq, and to kill Saddam Hussein. The Gulf War had blunted any immediate threat from Iraq. But Saddam had proven he could launch missiles into the heart of Israel. We knew from our i

urate at long range. But they could reach Israeli towns and cities, and could carry not just conventional explosives but chemical warheads. Moreover, Saddam had used chemical weapons: during the Iran-Iraq war, and to kill thousands of his own restive Kurdish population in the town of Halabja in the spring

t reminded me of how my father had spoken to me when I was growing up - minus the "well-off family" part. 232 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028080 When we got to Hussein's country home, we were greeted by an impressively self-assured man in his late 20s who, like Hussein, had studied at Britain's military academy in S

oreign Minister David Levy; Ariye Deri, the leader of the Sephardi Orthodox party Shas; and two 235 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028083 young Likud politicians, Dan Meridor and Ehud Olmert, with whom I had become friendly. They, like me, were concerned about undermining the Americans' military and diplomatic coalition. S