Epstein Secrets

quickly loses its appeal when one is dealing with dictators who are less noxious. And even when they are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still fraught with difficulty since the worse the autocrat, the worse the chaos left in his wake. That is

y are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is

ot less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still f

ery That Remains Ethan Bronner Article 2. Article 3. Article 4. Herald Tribune Buying Into Palestinian Statehood Yossi Alpher, Colette Avital, Shlomo Gazit, and Mark Heller The Daily Star What the Arab revolts leave unanswered Rami G. Khouri Guardian Why Israel is wrong about Iran Meir Javedanfar

pecially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor without telling the Ame

ady to carry out. Several of the most complex centered on the new threat posed by Palestinian groups in Lebanon. Before the civil war in Jordan, King Hussein had accused Fatah, the PFLP and the equally militant Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine of trying to create "a state within a state" an

nments had always calculated that we needed at least some measure of support from foreign allies, especially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein's nuclear reactor without telling the Americans beforehand. Shortly after I returned to the kirya, he provoked further anger in Washington by announcin

intelligence department was responsible for drafting an annual strategic assessment for the army and the government. The final report was written by Shlomo Gazit, who had succeeded Eli Zeira as head of military intelligence. Before we sent it to print, he held a long meeting, inviting the views of all the mili

might not present a conventional threat. Yet while I’d been with my tank company in the Sinai, they were fighting a full-scale civil war against King Hussein’s army in Jordan. The catalyst: a multiple hijacking in September 1970, a sign that they were turning to non-conventional warfare, and to acts of ter

nments had always calculated that we needed at least some measure of support from foreign allies, especially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor without telling the Americans beforehand. Shortly after I returned to the kirya, he provoked further anger in Washington by announcin

pecially the US. Under Begin, we'd already bombed Saddam Hussein’s nuclear reactor without telling the Ame

intelligence department was responsible for drafting an annual strategic assessment for the army and the government. The final report was written by Shlomo Gazit, who had succeeded Eli Zeira as head of military intelligence. Before we sent it to print, he held a long meeting, inviting the views of all the mili

ope" that I have just described, were laid by Moshe Dayan and Shlomo Gazit, and of course by Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, Yitzhak Rabin and King Hussein of Jordan, and again Rabin and Shimon Peres. We must not allow the shortsighted populists that currently lead us to destroy this achievement, and

arak speech, Nov 28, 2016, at the book launch of "At Crucial Junctures" by Shlomo Gazit "At Crucial Junctures" is a particularly unique book. It is Shlomo Gazit's life story, from his time in the Palmach to this very day-75 years of fruitful and devoted activity on behalf of Israel and its security, presented

om in Gaza's Ruins Belies Misery That Remains Ethan Bronner Article 2. Herald Tribune Buying Into Palestinian Statehood Yossi Alpher, Colette Avital, Shlomo Gazit, and Mark Heller Article 3. The Daily Star What the Arab revolts leave unanswered Rami G. Khouri Article 4. Guardian Why Israel is wrong about Iran M

g quickly loses its appeal when one is dealing with dictators who are less noxious. And even when they are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still fraught with difficulty since the worse the autocrat, the worse the chaos left in his wake. That is be

ey are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is

not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still fr