Epstein Secrets

of the last U.S. troops from Iraq, we're finally going to get the answer to the core question about that country: Was Iraq the way Iraq was because Saddam was the way Saddam was, or was Saddam the way Saddam was because Iraq is the way Iraq is — a collection of sects and tribes unable to live togethe

s been a mounting campaign by the prime minister, a Shiite with close ties to Iran, against perceived Sunni enemies. Hundreds of former members of Saddam Hussein's Baath party have been arrested in recent weeks. EFTA_R1_01992712 EFTA02681497 14 Security forces controlled by Mr. Maliki have surrounded the c

ternal iron fist that held Iraq together (Saddam Hussein) and the external iron fist (the U.S. armed force

e personality. In the end, though, Hafez chose Bashar as his successor, giving him the role of the dignified leader, and named Maher as the head of the Republican Guard, the enforcer. (This would not have been a new arrangement for the Assad EFTA_R1_0 1992732 EFTA02681517 34 family, for Hafez himself had an agg

-Arab disputes, largely because of Syrian incitement. The Syrian regime, under the weight of an unprecedented popular uprising, is doing today what Saddam Hussein did when he occupied Kuwait, where Saddam gave Iran all he had fought with it for, over eight years, with the stroke of a pen. Today, it seems lik

nt. The Syrian regime, under the weight of an unprecedented popular uprising, is doing today what Saddam Hussein did when he occupied Kuwait, where Saddam gave Iran all he had fought with it for, over eight years, with the stroke of a pen. Today, it seems like the regime in Damascus is ready to do the

nted popular uprising, is doing today what Saddam Hussein did when he occupied Kuwait, where Saddam gave I

f his desire for new reform laws. But U.S. officials say he has supported (or acceded to) hard-liners led by his brother Maher, who is commander of the Republican Guard, and Hafez Makhlouf, a cousin who heads other security forces. The Syrian equation is shaped by two "X-factors." The first is whether the army wil

nted popular uprising, is doing today what Saddam Hussein did when he occupied Kuwait, where Saddam gave I

-Arab disputes, largely because of Syrian incitement. The Syrian regime, under the weight of an unprecedented popular uprising, is doing today what Saddam Hussein did when he occupied Kuwait, where Saddam gave Iran all he had fought with it for, over eight years, with the stroke of a pen. Today, it seems lik

nt. The Syrian regime, under the weight of an unprecedented popular uprising, is doing today what Saddam Hussein did when he occupied Kuwait, where Saddam gave Iran all he had fought with it for, over eight years, with the stroke of a pen. Today, it seems like the regime in Damascus is ready to do the

f his desire for new reform laws. But U.S. officials say he has supported (or acceded to) hard-liners led by his brother Maher, who is commander of the Republican Guard, and Hafez Makhlouf, a cousin who heads other security forces. The Syrian equation is shaped by two "X-factors." The first is whether the army wil