Epstein Secrets

's top spy agency, the ghosts of Ir .q are never far away. EFTA00656344 One C.I.A. analyst who had helped develop some of the intelligence about Saddam Hussein's supposed weapons of mass destruction had a breakdown months after the Iraq war began; he had participated in the post-invasion hunt there that foun

ad helped develop some of the intelligence about Saddam Hussein's supposed weapons of mass destruction ha

ss," the Brotherhood's Secretary General Mahmoud Hussein said during the conference explaining the reason

tly because of the scar tissue they still have from Iraq," added Mr. Thielmann, now a senior fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington. Paul Pillar, a former senior C.I.A. analyst on the Middle East, says he believes that analysts are guided by the facts in making their assessments about Iran,

quickly loses its appeal when one is dealing with dictators who are less noxious. And even when they are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still fraught with difficulty since the worse the autocrat, the worse the chaos left in his wake. That is

y are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is

ot less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still f

hael Noonan. "I don't think [Gates's] accomplishments merit the sky-high reputation that he enjoys as he leaves office," former senior CIA analyst Paul Pillar says. "Gates has long had a knack for nurturing his own reputation." Pillar recalls that Gates during his CIA days was "always saying, 'I'm going

Michael Noonan. "I don't think [Gates's] accomplishments merit the sky-high reputation that he enjoys as he leaves office," former senior CIA analyst Paul Pillar says. "Gates has long had a knack for nurturing his own reputation." Pillar recalls that Gates during his CIA days was "always saying, 'I'm going to

g quickly loses its appeal when one is dealing with dictators who are less noxious. And even when they are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still fraught with difficulty since the worse the autocrat, the worse the chaos left in his wake. That is be

ey are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is

not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still fr