Epstein Secrets

g quickly loses its appeal when one is dealing with dictators who are less noxious. And even when they are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still fraught with difficulty since the worse the autocrat, the worse the chaos left in his wake. That is be

ey are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is

not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still fr

always preferable to hard ones, even if the process takes some time. A moral argument can be made that monsters like Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya and Kim Jong-il in North Korea should be overthrown any way they can, as fast as we can, regardless of the risk of short-term chaos. But that reasoning quickly loses

ld," said President Bush. So much for accountability. Then, of course, there was Vice President Cheney: "We do know, with absolute certainty, that (Saddam Hussein] is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to build a nuclear weapon." -- "No. I think we may wel

s liberators, and that will help us to keep requirements down ... It's hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post- Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army. Hard to imagine. And the bi

e do know, with absolute certainty, that (Saddam Hussein] is using his procurement system to acquire the e

r. Kokintz decides to keep that fact to himself considering that the pretense still furthers the cause of world peace. I am not sure if 28 year old Kim Jong-il, Supreme Leader of North Korea has ever read the book or saw the movie, but this past week when he threaten a pre-emptive nuclear strike on the Unit

quickly loses its appeal when one is dealing with dictators who are less noxious. And even when they are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still fraught with difficulty since the worse the autocrat, the worse the chaos left in his wake. That is

y are not less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is

ot less noxious, as in the case of Iraq's Saddam Hussein, the moral argument for their removal is still f

lways preferable to hard ones, even if the process takes some time. A moral argument can be made that monsters like Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya and Kim Jong-il in North Korea should be overthrown any way they can, as fast as we can, regardless of the risk of short-term chaos. But that reasoning quickly lo

fer that was very favorable to the West. The time was mid-2003, a point at which the United States showed its military might by easily disposing of Saddam's army in weeks, and with few casualties-a feat Iran could not accomplish after fighting him for eight years. The fact that the Bush administration

ld that had acquired a perverse kind of stability. The status quo was hardly perfect, but it was, particularly after the Iraq war and the demise of Saddam Hussein, relatively manageable for the Arabs and the West. Now all of that is gone. Within a year -- a stunningly inconsequential unit of time in the grand

arly after the Iraq war and the demise of Saddam Hussein, relatively manageable for the Arabs and the West

ture. Since the primary outlines of the agreement were actually negotiated during U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks held in July and October 2011 prior to Kim Jong-il's death, the agreement itself provides limited insight into how North Korea's new leadership makes decisions aside from reinforcing the North Korean