Epstein Secrets

exhausted, risks endangering this critically important US backing. In the aftermath of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and as foreign minister in Rabin's government, Peres was at the front line of Israel's efforts to ward off Egypt's efforts to press Israel to sign the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation

d Dick Cheney." Her most recent book, Drift, documents how easy it has become for U.S. presidents to wage war without congressional consent. 28. Dennis Ross Having served under President Jimmy Carter and in every administration since (except George W. Bush's), Dennis Ross has played a bigger role in se

ussions. In every administration I was a part of -- and every negotiation in which I participated -- he was raised by Israeli prime ministers. From Rabin through Netanyahu, one thing could be counted on: Pollard would be raised. We may view him as a spy; Israelis view him differently. He has taken o

ng Jonathan Pollard's release in Mideast peace talks is premature Editorial Article 3. The Washington Institute Pollard Release Seems Justified Dennis Ross Article 4. The American Interest Releasing Pollard: Don't Do It, Mr. Secretary Daniel Kurtzer Article 5. Hurriyet Turkey - Lessons from the ba

Arik, as did Sharon for him. With uneasiness, questions and outright criticism of the siege building both internationally and inside Israel, Arik got Rabin to helicopter north with him to Beirut. Yitzhak spent six or seven hours there. His verdict on the siege, at least as reported in the Israeli press,

lude withdrawing from the Golan. The formula was agreed in a meeting in Israel between Rabin and the Clinton Administration’s Middle East negotiator, Dennis Ross. Rabin didn’t tell Peres or other ministers about it, though Itamar Rabinovich did know. I did as well. Since acceptance of the need for a withdrawal

something Bibi still clearly wanted to avoid as much as humanly possible. It was an attempt to engage with Syria. He asked me about the talks under Rabin and Peres, and my views on the possibility of a deal with President Assad. He also wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrange

ly with the President, something I know sometimes frustrated other senior US negotiators like Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Mideast envoy Dennis Ross. This was not out of any disrespect for them. It was because the decisions on which negotiations would succeed or fail would have to be made at the t

, something Bibi still clearly wanted to avoid as much as humanly possible. It was an attempt to engage with Syria. He asked me about the talks under Rabin and Peres, and my views on the possibility of a deal with President Assad. He also wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrange

ly with the President, something I know sometimes frustrated other senior US negotiators like Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Mideast envoy Dennis Ross. This was not out of any disrespect for them. It was because the decisions on which negotiations would succeed or fail would have to be made at the t

"This trip is a signal that the president has an interest, not just in the peace issue, but also in the broader concerns that Israel is facing," said Dennis Ross, a senior Middle East adviser to Obama during his first term who is at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "In some ways, it will be the p

in and President Arafat made everyone around them, including myself, feel that peace was possible. There was significant progress in all tracks until Rabin's assassination by an Israeli terrorist -- after he was killed, no Israeli leader had the vision to understand that the window of opportunity for a t

"This trip is a signal that the president has an interest, not just in the peace issue, but also in the broader concerns that Israel is facing," said Dennis Ross, a senior Middle East adviser to Obama during his first term who is at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "In some ways, it will be the p

in and President Arafat made everyone around them, including myself, feel that peace was possible. There was significant progress in all tracks until Rabin's assassination by an Israeli terrorist -- after he was killed, no Israeli leader had the vision to understand that the window of opportunity for a t