Epstein Secrets

city cable, and on the main oil pipeline from Suez City to Cairo. Still, for many weeks, the answer from the Airya was no. The man who had succeeded Rabin as chief-of-staff after the war, Chaim Bar-Lev, dismissed it as “a plan built on chicken legs.” In the end, what got us the green light was a further

re were nearly 100 missile sites in the “prohibited” zone, giving the Egyptians control of 20 miles or more of the airspace on our side of the canal. Golda was incensed. So was Bar-Lev. But there was no way, and no will, to reopen the fighting and force Nasser to move the missiles back. The cease-fire t

something Bibi still clearly wanted to avoid as much as humanly possible. It was an attempt to engage with Syria. He asked me about the talks under Rabin and Peres, and my views on the possibility of a deal with President Assad. He also wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrange

ve the political experience in war that none of Olmert’s other ministers could offer. He’d been by Ben-Gurion’s side during the 1956 war, had been in Golda’s government in 1967, and was Defense Minister after the 1973 war, through Entebbe, until Begin’s defeated Labor in the 1977 election. Despite our ow

icity cable, and on the main oil pipeline from Suez City to Cairo. Still, for many weeks, the answer from the kirya was no. The man who had succeeded Rabin as chief-of-staff after the war, Chaim Bar-Lev, dismissed it as "a plan built on chicken legs." In the end, what got us the green light was a further

re were nearly 100 missile sites in the "prohibited" zone, giving the Egyptians control of 20 miles or more of the airspace on our side of the canal. Golda was incensed. So was Bar-Lev. But there was no way, and no will, to reopen the fighting and force Nasser to move the missiles back. The cease-fire to

, something Bibi still clearly wanted to avoid as much as humanly possible. It was an attempt to engage with Syria. He asked me about the talks under Rabin and Peres, and my views on the possibility of a deal with President Assad. He also wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrange

ve the political experience in war that none of Olmert's other ministers could offer. He'd been by Ben-Gurion's side during the 1956 war, had been in Golda's government in 1967, and was Defense Minister after the 1973 war, through Entebbe, until Begin's defeated Labor in the 1977 election. Despite our ow