Epstein Secrets

exhausted, risks endangering this critically important US backing. In the aftermath of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference and as foreign minister in Rabin's government, Peres was at the front line of Israel's efforts to ward off Egypt's efforts to press Israel to sign the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation

orked for Secretaries Warren Christopher and Madeleine Albright -- Wendy Sherman has occupied the No. 3 spot in Foggy Bottom since last year. Under Albright, she coordinated North Korea policy, and today she is the Lop U.S. en gotiator on another of the United States' stickiest diplomatic cases -- Iran'

to solve this.” 7 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011478 I sensed, at the time, at least the start of some connection. I suspected that Arafat viewed me, as he had Rabin before me, as a “fellow fighter”. But if so, I now wondered whether that might have been part of the problem in his ever truly understanding my missi

say that Arafat was not ready at this time to make the historic compromises needed for peace. But before parting with President Clinton and Secretary Albright, I’d been more forthright. It was clear, without my saying so, that the chances of our getting a peace agreement on Clinton’s watch were now pretty m

something Bibi still clearly wanted to avoid as much as humanly possible. It was an attempt to engage with Syria. He asked me about the talks under Rabin and Peres, and my views on the possibility of a deal with President Assad. He also wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrange

was whatever further movement they might cajole out of our negotiators. Still, on day-three of Clinton’s absence, I got a note saying that Secretary Albright was on her way to my cabin. I didn’t want the needless diplomatic difficulty involved in again telling her I could not sanction free- wheeling, and d

to solve this.” 7 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_027855 I sensed, at the time, at least the start of some connection. I suspected that Arafat viewed me, as he had Rabin before me, as a “fellow fighter”. But if so, I now wondered whether that might have been part of the problem in his ever truly understanding my missi

say that Arafat was not ready at this time to make the historic compromises needed for peace. But before parting with President Clinton and Secretary Albright, I’d been more forthright. It was clear, without my saying so, that the chances of our getting a peace agreement on Clinton’s watch were now pretty m

, something Bibi still clearly wanted to avoid as much as humanly possible. It was an attempt to engage with Syria. He asked me about the talks under Rabin and Peres, and my views on the possibility of a deal with President Assad. He also wanted my assessment about whether the army could work out arrange

was whatever further movement they might cajole out of our negotiators. Still, on day-three of Clinton's absence, I got a note saying that Secretary Albright was on her way to my cabin. I didn't want the needless diplomatic difficulty involved in again telling her I could not sanction free- wheeling, and d