Epstein Secrets

here is no support for CEOS's view that the courts or a jury should ultimately decide whether a "novel" construction of the law is correct. Instead, the Executive Branch itself has a non-delegable obligation not to exceed its authority; the power of other branches to check or remedy such usurpation does not legitimi

have "traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of federal criminal statutes, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, Dowling'. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), and out of concern that 'a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will u

y have “traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of federal criminal statutes, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), and out of concern that ‘a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will un

There is no support for CEOS’s view that the courts or a jury should ultimately decide whether a “novel” construction of the law is correct. Instead, the Executive Branch itself has a non-delegable obligation not to exceed its authority; the power of other branches to check or remedy such usurpation does not legitimize

have "traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of federal criminal statutes, both out of deference to the prerogatives of Congress, Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985), and out of concern that `a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will

here is no support for CEOS's view that the courts or a jury should ultimately decide whether a "novel" construction of the law is correct. Instead, the Executive Branch itself has a non-delegable obligation not to exceed its authority; the power of other branches to check or remedy such usurpation does not legitimi