Epstein Secrets

y had been in his home and/or belonged to him, which would, in turn, at a minimum, implicitly authenticate the contents of the materials. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 2003 WL 23024461 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. December 29, 2003) (act of production privileged where government's claimed relevance for requiring the

n in effect until you arc granted leave to depart by the court or by an officer acting • ni behalf of the court. poem) is issued upon application 'Med States of America DATE: March 2, 2007 Name, Address and Phone Number of Assistant U.S. Attorney ssistant U.S. Attorney 500 So. Australian Avenue, Suite 400 West

rth Amendment's particularity requirement and overbreadth prohibition are critical in the context of computer searches. See, e.g., United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[wje understand the heightened specificity concerns in the computer context, given the vast amounts of data

ite search is not in question. Courts have long accepted that large quantities of paper documents may be carried off-site for subsequent search. See United States'. Santarelli 778 F.2d 609 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that agents acted reasonably when they removed documents for examination at another location wher

omputer files are easy to disguise or misname). Furthermore, courts are increasingly recognizing that computer forensics is as much art as science. See United States'. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2005) Thus, warrant applications for computer data seeking ownership and control evidence should be drafted in a

ly recognizing that computer data relevant to a warrant calbe easily hidden, and may require an in depth forensic review. See, e.g., United States. Adjani, 452 F. 3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006) (computer files are easy to disguise or misname). Furthermore, courts are increasingly recognizing that computer fo

s apply the rule that a test which does nothing more than indicate the presence or absence of contraband does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. In United Slates'. Thomas 757 F.2d 1359 (2d. Cir. 1985), the Second Circuit rejected a broad application of this rule. In particular, it held that a dog sniff outside

ant to describe the forensic methodology that would be used in the subsequent examination of the seized media. A similar conclusion was reached in United States'. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2005). Brooks and other courts have observed that the discretion of the forensic examiner is best circumscribed b

d States I. Adiani 452 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2006), the court observed that ...the warrant arguably might have provided for a "less invasive search of Adjani's [email) 'inbox' and 'outbox' for the addressees specifically cited in the warrant, as opposed to the wholesale search of the contents of all emai

y had been in his home and/or belonged to him, which would, in turn, at a minimum, implicitly authenticate the contents of the materials. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 2003 WL 23024461 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. December 29, 2003) (act of production privileged where government's claimed relevance for requiring the

rth Amendment's particularity requirement and overbreadth prohibition are critical in the context of computer searches. See, e.g., United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1149 (91h Cir. 2006) ("[w]e understand the heightened specificity concerns in the computer context, given the vast amounts of data