Epstein Secrets

SANBORN, and THOMAS, Circuit Judges. STONE, Circuit Judge- This is an appeal from a conviction for violation of the White Slave Traffic Act, IS U.S.C.A. § 397 ct seq. Appellant urges here three claimed er- rors: (1) Improper restriction of cross- examination of a witness; (2) error in the charge to

ses the emotional and psychic harm suffered by the child"). New York I Ferber. 458 U.S. 747. 758-59 & trtr9-1011982) (citations omitted); see also United Slates Yuknavich. 419 F.3d 1302. 1310 (11th Cir.2005) ("possession of child pornography is not a victimless crime")• Goff. 501 F.3d at 259 ("Consum

tside the Guidelines, the judge will explain why he has done so." 127 S.Ct. at 2468. The Supreme urt most recently addressed sentencing in Gall United Stases. 128 S.Ct. 586 (2007), and Kimbroushi United States. 128 S.Ct. 558 (2007). F" Gall reviewed the reasonableness of a sentence falling far below the

ssed; (4) submit to searches based on reasonable suspicion; and (5) register with the state sex-offender registry. After the district court denied the United States's motion to reconsider the sentence and impose either a sentence within the Guidelines, or a sentence of at least one day in prison followed by a li

f § 2423(c). Adopted in 2003 as part of the PROTECT Act, § 2423(c) provides as follows: (c) Engaging in illicit sexual conduct in foreign places. Any United States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who travels in foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual con- duct with another person

1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3258-59. "411 11. Notably, this notion of "just deserts" or retribution is a distinct consideration from general deterrence. See United States' Foss. 501 F.2d 522. 527 (1st Cir.1974) (cited with approval in the legislative history of Section 3553(a)) ("[T]he @ 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim t

immoral purposes, such act is not causing such trip within the meaning of section 2 but is, if any crime, the one stated in section 3 of the Act, U.S.C.A. Title 18, § 399. The pertinent language in the two sec- tions is: Section 2. "Any person who shall knowingly • • • cause to be transport- ed • •

s, powers that we have consistently described as 'plenary and exclus- ive' ... This Court has traditionally identified the In- dian Commerce Clause, U.S. Coast., Art. I, § 8. cl. 3, and the Treaty Clause, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, as sources of that power.") (citations omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has c

A) merely confers federal jurisdiction on otherwise illegal conduct, SORNA does not require that defendant know that conduct is illegal under SORNA. United States v Torres (2008, WD Ter) 599 F Supp 2d 767. Defendant, who was convicted of sex offense under Uniform Code of Military Justice, was sex offender who

and verify their information, 42 USCS §§ 16914, 16916, there was insufficient evidence to transform SORNA from civil scheme into criminal penalty. United States v Mason (2007, MD Fla) 510 F Supp 2d 923 (criticized in United States v Muzio (2007, ED Mo) 2007 US Dist LEXIS 54330) and (criticized in United States

e July 27, 2006, which was date Walsh Act was enacted; and (3) defendant's prosecution under 18 USCS § 2250(a) for violating Walsh Act did not raise U.S. Coast. art 1, § 9, cl. 3, Ex Post Facto Clause concerns because defendant was notified, at time of his conviction, that he would have to register in any n

s of his change in address after moving to Texas, requirement that he acknowledged receiving notice of, he would have been in compliance with SORNA. United States v Letourneau (2009, CA5 Tex) 2009 US App LEX1S 17349. Unpublished: Defendant was required to register as sex offender in Texas; additionally, defend

oss state lines and is authorized by Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, a 18; therefore, 42 USCS § 16913 is not unconstitutional. United States v Pena (2008, WD Tex) 582 FSupp 2d 851 (criticized in United States v Myers (2008, SD Fla) 21 FLW Fed D 473). District court treated 42 USCS § 1691

student status while remaining within state had too tenuous connection to substantial effect upon interstate commerce; Necessary and Proper Clause, U.S. Coast. art I, § 8, cl. 18, did not salvage constitutionality of § 16913 because § 16913 was not reasonably adapted means to achieve constitutional objecti