Epstein Secrets

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

il case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case

ts '[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

il case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

il case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

il case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case

ts `[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Government activity qualifies as a search under the Fourth A

t has already extended Franks past its precise factual context to a motion to suppress based on alleged misrepresentations in a wiretap application. See United States v. Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139, 151 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court concludes that Maxwell must at least meet this standard for a similar claim invoking the

il case. She acknowledges that she could have, but did not, invoke her Fifth Amendment rights to avoid providing incriminating testimony. See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263-24 & n.24 (1983). However, she contends that she testified only because she believed the protective order in that case