Epstein Secrets

zier, 944 F.2d 820, 825 (11th Cir. 1991) (even a witness who testifies before a grand jury is not required to keep his testimony secret); Blalock v. United Slates, 844 F.2d 1546, 1551 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Rule 6(e)(2) only protects information revealing what has occurred, or will occur, inside the grand jury ro

he Court's earlier finding. The Government also candidly admits that since then "the delay from October 28, 2010 through early March 2011 was due to the United States' efforts to reach [an] amicable resolution of the case . . . .. Gov't Resp. at 46 n.22. 9 The CVRA does not appear to impose specific timelines for v

ring before Epstein and Groff that had nothing to do with the inner workings of the grand jury. There is abundant caselaw to that effect. See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 944 F.2d 820, 825 (11th Cir. 1991) (even a witness who testifies before a grand jury is not required to keep his testimony secret); Blal

against Jeffrey Epstein in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, . . [the victims] cannot invoke any protections under the CVRA." Gov't Resp. at 8. This sweeping position is simply irreconcilable with § 3771(c)(I) of the CVRA. If an indictment is a prerequisite to CVRA rights, then depar

109, 116 (2d Cir.2005) (emphases The express language of Rule 410 also makes clear that "derivative evidence" is never excluded from a proceeding. See United States v. Ruhkowsi, 814 F.2d 594, 599 (11th Cir. 1987). 8 EFTA00205735 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 106 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/10/2011 Page 9 of 2

ary of Enclosures" and justified the privilege by characterizing the documents as "attorney-client communication[s]" without explanation.") (citing United States v. Constr. Prods. Research, Inc., 73 F.3d 464, 473 (2d Cir.1996)).8 Once the Government has cataloged the documents in its privilege log, it then bea

2). Epstein's lawyers, To be sure, as the Government points out, effective defense counsel should always explore plea bargaining opportunities. See Gov't Resp. at 7 (citing Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.C.t 1473, 1485 (2010)). But this is a far cry from proving there is a "right" to plea bargaining or that p

18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(4)." United States. Okun, 2009 WL 790042 at *2 (E.D.Va. 2009). Still another decision at odds with the Government's position is United States' Rubin, 2008 WL 2358591 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). This decision is instructive because it not only explains that victims have rights before the formal filing

he Court's earlier finding. The Government also candidly admits that since then "the delay from October 28, 2010 through early March 2011 was due to the United States' efforts to reach [an] amicable resolution of the case . . . ." Gov't Resp. at 46 n.22. 9 The CVRA does not appear to impose specific timelines for v

gainst Jeffrey Epstein in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, . . . [the victims] cannot invoke any protections under the CVRA." Gov't Resp. at 8. This sweeping position is simply irreconcilable with § 3771(c)(1) of the CVRA. If an indictment is a prerequisite to CVRA rights, then depar

utweighed by its prejudicial effect; and (4) the trial court gave an appropriate limiting instruction to the jury if so requested by the defendant." United States v. Arroyo, 600 F. App'x II, 13 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order) (quoting United States v. Lanam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004). are offered for im

n which apparently relied in reaching her conclusions. This Court should reject the government's untimely effort to save testimony from exclusion. See United States v. Lewis, 818 F. App'x 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (affirming exclusion of defendant's proffered expert evidence "that did not adhere to th

rly distinguished from normal adult-child interactions. . . . Furthermore, there are no methods of known psychometrics to validly assess grooming. Gov't Resp., Ex. A, p 2 (emphasis added). The article concludes: Currently there is no consensus regarding how to define grooming. In addition, there is no va

ing crime victims informed. Just as the Government cannot illegally agree to run a sentence on a new crime concurrently with a probation revocation, United States v. Walker, 98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1996), so too here it cannot illegally agree not to prosecute a sex offender without first conferring with his vict

es not cite the applicable civil rule is that it has yet to state clearly whether it is willing to abide by the civil rules in this case. See, e.g., Gov't Resp. Mot. Order Not Withhold Evid., DE #59 at 6-7 (refusing to take a position on whether civil rules apply or not). Indeed, the Government has yet to

ing crime victims informed. Just as the Government cannot illegally agree to run a sentence on a new crime concurrently with a probation revocation, United States I Walker, 98 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 1996), so too here it cannot illegally agree not to prosecute a sex offender without first conferring with his victi

es not cite the applicable civil rule is that it has yet to state clearly whether it is willing to abide by the civil rules in this case. See, e.g., Gov't Resp. Mot. Order Not Withhold Evid., DE #59 at 6-7 (refusing to take a position on whether civil rules apply or not). Indeed, the Government has yet to

g, the Government finally tries to claim that it is somehow forbidden from doing so by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and even the United States Constitution. These arguments are frivolous. With regard to Rule 6(e), the rule creates secrecy only for grand jury proceedings. The Government doe

ed by evidence in the record." The Government has briefly recounted a few facts in opposition to a small sliver of the victims' proposed facts. See Gov't Resp. to Victims' Motion to Have Facts Accepted at 11-13. But none of these facts are supported by any evidence at all. The Government should have at le

l them all of the helpful information I had. I understood that Mr. Edwards did that. I authorized Mr. Edwards to join me in the lawsuit against the U. S. Attorney's Office to enforce my rights and to try to get me my chance to confer with the prosecutors before Mr. Epstein took a plea or the case was

rnment deny that it sent "victim" notification letters to Jane Doe 2, both before it negotiated the NPA and after. See, e.g., DE 407 at 12,11 93-95 (Gov't Resp. to Victims' Statement of Undisputed Facts) (conceding a victim notification letter was sent to Jane Doe 2 in Jan. 2008). As the Court is well awar

e identified individuals." The letter further proposed that the attorney representative for the victims be instructed that "[t]he details regarding the United States's investigation of this matter and its resolution with Mr. Epstein is confidential. You may not make public statements regarding this matter." Id. at

ims' S.J. Mot."), DE 361 at 7-47 (listing 157 proposed undisputed facts). The Government has responded by contesting some facts, but not others. See Gov't Resp. to 2 EFTA00597319 Case 9:08-cv-80736-KAM Document 417 Entered on FLSD Docket 08/11/2017 Page 3 of 33 Petitioners' Statement of Undisputed Mater