Epstein Secrets

istent with how our circuit and others have articulated the doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467. 471-72 (9th Cir.2010); United Stales v. Yang, 286 F.3d 940.945-46 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116. 120 n. 2 (3d Cit 1994); United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545.

010). Reasonable suspicion is required precisely because the individual has regained an expectation of privacy by moving away from the border. See United Slates v. Villasenor. 608 F.3d 467.471-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, —U.S., 131 S.Ct. 547. 178 L.Ed.2d 401 (2010); United States v. Whiting. 781 F.2d 692.

bing a functional border search and those describing an extended border search, not in defining the standard for a search at the border. See, e.g., United States v. Cardona, 769 F.2d 625, 628 (9th Cir.1985) ("We have recently recognized the difficulty of making sharp distinctions between searches at the func

he Court has expressed support for the deterrence value of suspicionless searches of a routine nature, such as vehicle checkpoints near the border. See United States v. Maninez— Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) ("We note here only the substantiality of the public interest in the p

thority expansively. See 473 U.S. at 539-40. 542-44, 105 S.Ct. 3304. 3 See, e.g.. Flores-Montano. 541 U.S. at 152-55. 124 S.Ct. 1582 (overturning the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the border search of a gas tank required reasonable suspicion): Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616-22.97 S.Ct. 1972 (overturning the ■. Circu

v. Morgan State University, 495 Fed. Appx. 286, 289 (4th Cir. 2012); the Ninth Circuit has applied Perlman in a case arising under 28 U.S.C. §2255, United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 977 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012), and in a civil case, S.E.C. v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 656 F.3d 829, 830-31 (9th Cir. 2011); the Si

d by the work product privilege, it stopped short of advocating the recognition of a settlement/plea negotiation privilege under Rules 410 and 501. See United States' Response to Supplemental Briefing in Support of Motion to Intervene (Doc. 100). The government's institutional interests differ significantly from t

nterlocutory appeal from an order compelling the testimony of their former attorney over a claim of attorney-client privilege. The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Krane, concluding that the circumstances in Krane "support application of the Perlman doctrine because, without the ability to raise th

v. Morgan State University, 495 Fed. Appx. 286, 289 (4th Cir. 2012); the Ninth Circuit has applied Perlman in a case arising under 28 U.S.C. §2255, United States v. Gonzalez, 669 F.3d 974, 977 n.2 (9th Cir. 2012), and in a civil case, S.E.C. v. CMKM Diamonds, Inc., 656 F.3d 829, 830-31 (9th Cir. 2011); the Si

nterlocutory appeal from an order compelling the testimony of their former attorney over a claim of attorney-client privilege. The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Krane, concluding that the circumstances in Krane "support application of the Perlman doctrine because, without the ability to raise th

to Mr. Epstein's attorneys was produced to plaintiffs, not correspondence authored by Mr. Epstein's counsel during the course of the negotiations. See United States' Response to Supplemental Briefing in Support of Motion to Intervene (Doc. 100) at 2 ("To the knowledge of the government, the Jane Does have only r

from an order compelling the testimony of their former attorney over a claim of attorney-client privilege. The 10 EFTA00583769 Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Krane, concluding that the circumstances in Krane "support application of the Perlman doctrine because, without the ability to raise th

to Mr. Epstein's attorneys was produced to plaintiffs, not correspondence authored by Mr. Epstein's counsel during the course of the negotiations. See United States' Response to Supplemental Briefing in Support of Motion to Intervene (Doc. 100) at 2 ("To the knowledge of the government, the Jane Does have only r

terlocutory appeal from an order compelling the testimony of their former attorney over a claim of attorney-client privilege. The Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Krane, concluding that the circumstances in Krane "support application of the Perlman doctrine because, without the ability to raise th