Epstein Secrets

ATES, Respondent. OPINION AND ORDER This cause is before the Court upon Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (DE 361); the United States's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 408); Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion to Compel Answers (DE 348) and Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion fo

osecutorial agreement, including a non-prosecution agreement, reached in violation of a prosecutor's conferral obligations under the statute. Doe v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2013). Third, section 3771(d)(5) of the CVRA authorizes the setting aside of pre-charge prosecutorial agreeme

y, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and any doubts in this regard should be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifyin

ATES, Respondent. OPINION AND ORDER This cause is before the Court upon Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (DE 361); the United States's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 408); Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion to Compel Answers (DE 348) and Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion fo

osecutorial agreement, including a non-prosecution agreement, reached in violation of a prosecutor's conferral obligations under the statute. Doe v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2013). Third, section 3771(d)(5) of the CVRA authorizes the setting aside of pre-charge prosecutorial agreeme

y, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and any doubts in this regard should be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifyin

racts, Epstein and Fisher continue, the lease between OFM and Epstein contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, citing Neal & Co. I. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 600 (1996), affd, 121 F.3d 683 (Fed.Cir.1997). The requirement of good faith and fair dealing, they argue, prohibits OFM from withholdi

ter that federal law should apply, there is no federal statutory or common law governing landlord-tenant relations. Federal law should apply because the United States is a party. I have jurisdiction over this action based on 28 U.S.C. s 1345 and the FMA, 22 U.S.C. s 4301 et seq. The subject matter of this action i

. Summary judgment is inappropriate if, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences against the moving party, id. at 255 (citing Adickes I S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)), there exists a dispute about a material fact "such that a reasonable jury could return

ATES, Respondent. OPINION AND ORDER This cause is before the Court upon Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (DE 361); the United States's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 408); Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion to Compel Answers (DE 348) and Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion fo

osecutorial agreement, including a non-prosecution agreement, reached in violation of a prosecutor's conferral obligations under the statute. Doe v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2013). Third, section 3771(d)(5) of the CVRA authorizes the setting aside of pre-charge prosecutorial agreeme

y, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and any doubts in this regard should be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifyin

ATES, Respondent. OPINION AND ORDER This cause is before the Court upon Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (DE 361); the United States's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 408); Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion to Compel Answers (DE 348) and Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion fo

osecutorial agreement, including a non-prosecution agreement, reached in violation of a prosecutor's conferral obligations under the statute. Doe v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2013). Third, section 3771(d)(5) of the CVRA authorizes the setting aside of pre-charge prosecutorial agreeme

y, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and any doubts in this regard should be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifyin

ATES, Respondent. OPINION AND ORDER This cause is before the Court upon Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (DE 361); the United States's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (DE 408); Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion to Compel Answers (DE 348) and Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Motion fo

osecutorial agreement, including a non-prosecution agreement, reached in violation of a prosecutor's conferral obligations under the statute. Doe v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267 (S.D. Fla. 2013). Third, section 3771(d)(5) of the CVRA authorizes the setting aside of pre-charge prosecutorial agreeme

y, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and any doubts in this regard should be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifyin

ter that federal law should apply, there is no federal statutory or common law governing landlord-tenant relations. Federal law should apply because the United States is a party. I have jurisdiction over this action based on 28 U.S.C. s 1345 and the FMA, 22 U.S.C. s 4301 et seq. The subject matter of this action i

Summary judgment is inappropriate if, resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences against the moving party, id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)), there exists a EFTA00204762 dispute about a material fact "such that a reasonable ju

p this [i.e., the NPA] from becoming public." (DE 407 at ¶ 37.) On September 24, 2007, Epstein and the Office formally reached an agreement whereby the United States would defer federal prosecution in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida. Epstein and the Office accordingly entered into a NPA reflecting su

y, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and any doubts in this regard should be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifyin

ein was within his rights to attempt to persuade higher authorities within the Department of Justice to overrule the prosecutorial decisions of the U. S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of Florida, the CVRA was designed to give the victims the same opportunity to attempt to affect prosecuto

p this [i.e., the NPA] from becoming public." (DE 407 at 1137.) On September 24, 2007, Epstein and the Office formally reached an agreement whereby the United States would defer federal prosecution in favor of prosecution by the State of Florida. Epstein and the Office accordingly entered into a NPA reflecting su

y, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), and any doubts in this regard should be resolved against the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifyin