Epstein Secrets

ity.") (citation omitted); Liggett Group Inc., v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 116 F.R.D. 205, 210

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

., Joe B. Brown, U.S. Atty., Margaret Huff, Asst. U.S. Atty., Nashville, Tenn., for defendant- appellee. Before KEITH and CONTIE, Circuit Judges, BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge. BAILEY BROWN, Senior Circuit Judge. This appeal involves sections 203' and 204 1 of Title II of the Labor Management Repor

ludes disclosure of communications between attorney and client and does not protect against disclosure of the facts un- derlying the communication. Upjohn Co. 12. The court below erroneously applied the Ten- nessee law of attorney-client privilege. Al- though Federal Rule of Evidence 501 does not apply i

lity.") (citation omitted); Liggett Group Inc., I Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. , 116 F.R.D. 205, 210

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. I United States , 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records . . . in the hands of an attorney—or

Nevertheless, after Capehart had read the official reports on the shooting, he confessed they had "forced me to deal with two uncomfortable truths: Brown never surrendered with his hands up, and Wilson was justified in shooting Brown." * Hate-crime hoax epidemic: Vilifying conservatives with various

_00059577 CONFIDENTIAL - PURSUANT TO FED. R.CCIN(F IDENTIAL DB-SONY-0022401 EFTA 00170127 EFTA01296795 Page 71 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87203, * Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 402, 101 S. Ct. 677, 66 L. Ed. 2d 584 (1981)); see also In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1080 (4th Cir. 1981) (even under c

ty.") (citation omitted); Liggett Group Inc., v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 210 (

tions, but does not prevent disclosure from the client's records the underlying factual information included in attorney-client communications. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). For this reason, putting otherwise non-privileged business records ... in the hands of an attorney—or p

atutory aggravating factors ... must now be alleged in the indictment and found by a jury in capital cases"); see also Bourgeois, 423 F.3d at 507; Brown, 441 F.3d at 1367 (collecting cases). Here, the district court noted that the government "implicitly conceded" that the Fifth Amendment requires

enabling the client to conform his conduct to the dictates of the law and to present le- gitimate claims and dt enses f if litigation ensues. See Upjohn Co. I United States, O 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. https://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstream.aspx?vi-2.0&mt=EleventhCircuit

by any materials in the record. Accordingly, these assertions of privilege are inadequate. See Bogle. McClure, 332 F.3d 347, 1358 (11th Cir. 2003); Brown' City of Margate, 842 F.Supp. 515, 520 Should the Court allow the Government to assert privilege with regard to any of the materials, the victims w

/2013 Page 5 of 12 connection with the specific representation." Id. at 619. The Seventh Circuit found this letter brought the case squarely within Upjohn Co. v. United States 449 U.S. 383 (1981), "which explained that factual investigations performed by attorneys as attorneys fall comfortably within the