Epstein Secrets

b. c. 7. You socialized with minor females in the presence of Donald Trump, Alan De ;Ishowitz, Bill Clinton, Tommy Manta, David Copperfield, and Bill Richardson. 8. You have transported on your airplanes minor females with whom you have engaged in sexual activity. 9. You engaged in the act of trafficking

Clinton, Tommy Manta, David Copperfield, and Bill Richardson. 8. You have transported on your airplanes mino

Avenue South, Suite 1400 West Palm Beach, FL 33401 Phone: (561)-659-8300 F4: (561)-835-8691 Attbrneys for Jeffrey Epstein Gaiy M. Fanner, Esq. Fanner, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos & Lebrman, PL 425 N. Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 Phone: (954)-524-2820 Fat: (954)-524-28

ure. Consequently, their motion should be denied. III. THE REQUESTED DEPOSITIONS, WHICH INCLUDE DEPOSITIONS OF FBI SPECIAL AGENTS KUYRICENDALL AND RICHARDS, SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED Petitioners seek to depose four federal prosecutors (including two former United Sates Attorneys) and FBI Special Agents

and 2 v. United States, Case No. 08-80736-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON United States District Court, Southern District of Florida Bradley J. Edwards, Esq., Fanner, Jaffe, Weissing, Edwards, Fistos & Lehrman, ■. 425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 (954) 524-2820 10 EFTA00618031

. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) 115, 116, 118 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) 165 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) 116 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencra

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00077619 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

r Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) 115, 116, 118 Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) 165 Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) 116 Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 (1987) 212 Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1991) 168, 172 Rochin, 342 U.S., 72 S. Ct. 205 153 Rosencra

. 2003) 259 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 80 EFTA00039434 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) United States v. Fennell, 166, 169 179, 180 8, 20, 27 4

r Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame

s v. Resendiz-Ponce, 549 U.S. 102 (2007) 150, 155 xviii EFTA00095085 United States v. Ricco, 549 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1977) 42 United States v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1975) 36 United States v. Richardson, 537 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 2008) 200 United States v. Rioux, 930 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Co

nited States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966) 54 xii EFTA00095079 United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2008) 113, 114 United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) 120, 121 United States v. Feldman, 939 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2019) 6, 18, 22 United States v. Fennell, 496 F. Supp

r Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sarwari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are am

r Victim-2 to testify about her abuse twice. Cf. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987) (recognizing

mental ambiguity," however, "is the exception, not the rule." United States v. Sanvari, 669 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fanner, 137 F.3d 1265, 1269 (10th Cir. 1998)). A defendant cannot demonstrate fundamental ambiguity simply by showing that words used in a question are ame