Epstein Secrets

ire. The Israelis wanted more time to transform their initial reversals into military gains. At the height of the crisis, then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger secretly cabled the Israeli ambasKdor to Washington that "we would under- stand if Israelis felt they required some additional time for military

r. That gave them a stake in making peace, too. After the war ended. Egypt and Syria joined in active diplomacy, masterfully orchestrated by Di. Kissinger, who managed to create enough distance between the Unit- ed States and Israel to allow some negotiating room. Mr. Sadat felt confident enough as t

o pull it off, she will need to move more toward Dr. Kissinger's stance of honest broker. To turn the Lebanon

197.E war is that it opened the door to peace. The Ar- abs humiliated by earlier wars with Israel, now could claim a measure of dignity because of Anwar Sadat's attack across the canal. The Israelis learned that their Arab adversaries wouldn't run from battle, as they had in the 1967 war. That gave them

live and throw garbage in everyone else's backyard. The prospects generally lack the public presence and star power of most Foggy Bottom occupants--Henry Kissinger, Colin Powell, and Condi Rice, for example. And they certainly don't rival Hillary Clinton, who is determined both to stay until January and not be

star power of most Foggy Bottom occupants--Henry Kissinger, Colin Powell, and Condi Rice, for example. And

s is longtime Nasserist MP Hamdeen Sabahi, who boasts opposition credentials dating back to his days as a student activist under the late President Anwar Sadat. But the Muslim Brotherhood is still in this race, and shouldn't be counted out. Knowing in advance that Shater's disqualification was a possibilit

ught to be China's strategic role and responsibilities? Brzezinski: Zheng is refining his idea of "convergence of interests" in conversations with Henry Kissinger, myself, and others. It is a process. It is a sign that the Chinese are serious in seeking a role to play without hegemonic ambitions — at the mom

rgence of interests" in conversations with Henry Kissinger, myself, and others. It is a process. It is a si

actually known ferocious rebellions. It had been Mubarak's good fortune that the land tolerated him for three decades. The designated successor to Anwar al-Sadat, Mubarak had been a cautious man, but his reign had sprouted dynastic ambitions. For 18 magical days in January and February, Egyptians of all wal

democratic movement. As a diplomat and key figure in Obama's Russia policy, he supports the realpolitik practiced by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. As an architect of the reset policy, McFaul found himself vulnerable to Moscow's provocations and pressure given Washington's conciliatory stance

racticed by former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. As an architect of the reset policy, McFaul fou

ce process is that whoever makes the Israeli silent majority feel morally insecure about occupation but strategically secure in Israel wins. After Anwar Sadat flew to Jerusalem, Israelis knew there was no way morally that they could hold onto the Sinai and strategically they did not feel the need to any l

the last word! 357 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017444 4.2.12 WC: 191694 APPENDIX — VIGNETTES Justice Harlen 358 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017445 4.2.12 WC: 191694 Henry Kissinger 359 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017446 4.2.12 WC: 191694 Opera Tickets 360 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017447 4.2.12 WC: 191694 Cardinal Glemp 361 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_

HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017445 4.2.12 WC: 191694 Henry Kissinger 359 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017446 4.2.12 WC: 191694

beautiful illustrations of the Passover story. At our ecumenical Seder, which usually includes several dozen guests of all religions—we once invited Anwar Sadat’s daughter—we distribute the different Haggadahs among the participants, and each one reads a passage in the English translation. I try to make the pas

his has happened before” or “This is how we got to where we are,” Nietzsche believed, it was the first step towards knowing where to go next. Nan and Kissinger knew the need for something else for our age as well, for a different instinct. It wasn’t just about knowing your history or feeling the real possibi

n Classics, 2015) 47 It was possible: Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960) 48 ] mention all this: Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. See chapter one, and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (TK London, 1988) 41 HOUSE_

wer after the 80 “Wisner landed”: William Colby, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York 1978), 73 59 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_018291 assassination of Anwar Sadat on a calm afternoon in October 1981. Wisner arrived a few years later. Though not quite a friend, Wisner had cultivated a directness at least, with M

the parties to something like binding arbitration, stop speaking about psychological breakthrough, and start implementing American policy—more Dr. Kissinger, less Dr. Phil. The breakdown Kerry described, after all, is not in actual negotiations but in a contrived show of reciprocity that masks how negot

willing and able to lead, they wouldn't need United States involvement. Perhaps Kerry will yet channel Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's inner Anwar Sadat and find Benjamin Netanyahu's inner Menachem Begin. But right now that has about the same odds as Warren Buffet's March Madness bracket bet. The sm