Epstein Secrets

n officials talk frequently about China in domestic contexts, the president's policy toward Beijing is fundamentally incoherent. Two recent books, Henry Kissinger's On China and Aaron Friedberg's A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, suggest two very different interpret

a, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, suggest two very different interpretations of Chinese conduct and propose alternative American responses. Kissinger views China as a rising but thus far moderate power and warns against creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that could lead to zero-sum competition b

ut it's kind of like, "Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who's the most important Muslim Arab Third World leader of them all?" And the answer is, "You, Muammar." He is really going have a very difficult time seeing people celebrating his going down, in terms of trying to sustain that heroic inner image. E

n officials talk frequently about China in domestic contexts, the president's policy toward Beijing is fundamentally incoherent. Two recent books, Henry Kissinger's On China and Aaron Friedberg's A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, suggest two very different interpret

a, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia, suggest two very different interpretations of Chinese conduct and propose alternative American responses. Kissinger views China as a rising but thus far moderate power and warns against creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that could lead to zero-sum competition b

ut it's kind of like, "Mirror, mirror, on the wall, who's the most important Muslim Arab Third World leader of them all?" And the answer is, "You, Muammar." He is really going have a very difficult time seeing people celebrating his going down, in terms of trying to sustain that heroic inner image. E

ne in emergency talks with his Soviet counterpart. The risk of war passed despite Beijing's provocative rhetoric, but Chinese bitterness did not—as Henry Kissinger would learn during his first meeting with Deng Xiaoping in 1974, when the topic of a U.S.-Soviet arms summit in Vladivostok prompted the future Chi

hetoric, but Chinese bitterness did not—as Henry Kissinger would learn during his first meeting with Deng X

ged to assume ownership of that process in an inclusive manner and thereby make it self-sustaining. Ditto Libya, where President Obama removed Col. Muammar el- Qaddafi's top-down, iron-fisted regime, but he declined to put U.S. troops on the ground to midwife a new social contract. The result: Libya to

emical attack, 183-84, 188-93 Kim Jong-un, 293 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 50-51 Kirk, Russell, 127 Kislyak, Sergey, 95, 106, 151, 154-55, 218, 236 Kissinger, Henry, 41, 77, 142, 145, 193, 226-28 Koch brothers, 178 Kudlow, Larry, 143, 207 Ku Klux Klan (KKK), 294-95 Kurtz, Howard, 217 Kushner, Charlie,

127-28, 140, 159, 195-97, 205, 217, 223, 237, 272, 284, 298 Franken, Al, 151-52 Freedom Caucus, 161, 171 Fusion GPS, 37, 99 G20 summit, 257 Gaddafi, Muammar, 270 Gamergate, 59 Gawker, 308 Gaza, 6 Gazprom, 101 Geffen, David, 12, 178 General Electric (GE), 88 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_020126 General Motors, 88