Epstein Secrets

e Ex. 4 at 1).27 AUSA-1 agreed to the meeting, and on or about February 29, 2016, AUSA- I met with three attorneys—Peter Skinner of Boies Schiller, Brad Edwards, and Stan Pottinger— regardingJeffrey Epstein. (See Ex. 4 at 1). Edwards and Pottinger were also attorneys for= who had alleged that she is a victim

016, AUSA- I met with three attorneys—Peter Skinner of Boies Schiller, Brad Edwards, and Stan Pottinger— regardingJeffrey Epstein. (See Ex. 4 at 1). Edwards and Pottinger were also attorneys for= who had alleged that she is a victim of sex crimes perpetrated by Epstein and Maxwell.28 (Ex. 5 at 1).29 At

, some version of the phrase "deliberate device" and "tactical advantage" is found in nearly every Second Circuit decision on the issue. See, e.g., Alameh, 341 F.3d at 176 ("intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical advantage"); Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (requiring "intentional device" to gain

Council v. United States Ening. Prot. Agency, 954 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020) 26 Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980) 13 United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2003) 29, 30, 31 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, (1996) passim United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir.

7, 8 Jan. 31, 2011) 12, 17 United States v. Delacruz, No. 14 Cr. 815 (KBF), 2015 WL 2211943, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2015) 16 United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1996) 13 United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1992) 30, 31, 33 United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir.

te not only (1) "had a discriminatory effect" but was also (2) "motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983

7, 8 Jan. 31, 2011) 12, 17 United States v. Delacruz, No. 14 Cr. 815 (KBF), 2015 WL 2211943, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2015) 16 United States v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 1996) 13 United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1992) 30, 31, 33 United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir.

te not only (1) "had a discriminatory effect" but was also (2) "motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983