te not only (1) "had a discriminatory effect" but was also (2) "motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983

Council v. United States Ening. Prot. Agency, 954 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2020) 26 Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980) 13 United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2003) 29, 30, 31 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, (1996) passim United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir.

te not only (1) "had a discriminatory effect" but was also (2) "motivated by a discriminatory purpose." Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465; United States v. Alameh, 341 F.3d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Fares, 978 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1229 (2d Cir. 1983

, some version of the phrase "deliberate device" and "tactical advantage" is found in nearly every Second Circuit decision on the issue. See, e.g., Alameh, 341 F.3d at 176 ("intentionally used delay to gain unfair tactical advantage"); Cornielle, 171 F.3d at 752 (requiring "intentional device" to gain