Epstein Secrets

o a mere two state prostitution-solicitation charges and agree to an 18-month sentence in the county jail. On September 16, 2007, Epstein's counsel Jay Lefkowitz sent the U.S. Attorney's Office a proposed written agreement, wherein the Office would extend immunity from federal prosecution to Epstein and cer

federal immunity. The co-conspirators did not sign the NPA and were not listed as parties to it. 7 As the NPA was being signed. Epstein's attorney Lefkowitz e-mailed AUSA Villafana, requesting: "Marie— Please do whatever you can to keep this (NPA) from becoming public." AUSA Villafana assured Lefkowitz that

st an offender before a legal tribunal, and pursuing them to final judgment on behalf of the state or government, as by indictment or information." Webster :r New International, supra, at 1987. Moreover, the law is clear, at least for Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel purposes, that a "prosecution" doe

victim elected to proceed exclusively under § 2255, as opposed to a civil damages action). 6 As the Agreement was being signed, Epstein's attorney Jay Lefkowitz e-mailed AUSA Villafana, requesting: "Marie - Please do whatever you can to keep this [Agreement] from becoming public." (emphasis added). AUSA Vil

illafana, requesting: "Marie - Please do whatever you can to keep this [Agreement] from becoming public." (emphasis added). AUSA Villafafia assured Lefkowitz that the Agreement would be kept confidential. 7 For example, in a December 6, 2007 letter, AUSA Villafana informed Lefkowitz that "fsjection 3771

der before a legal tribunal, and pursuing them to final judgment on behalf of the state or govemment, as by indictment or information." Prosecution, Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1944). Moreover, the law is clear, at least for Sixth Amendment right-to- counsel purposes, that a "prosecuti

g pursuant to those statues, the caselaw was not clear that all federal victims would liavc been allowed to participate in the state plea hearing. In Lefkowitz’s November 29, 2007 letter to Acosta, he argued tliat Ilie statutes afforded a right to speak at a defendant’s sentencing or to submit a statement on

by omission of material facts in his representations [to counsel].” Florida Bar v. Joy, 679 So. 2d 1165, 1166-68 (Fla. 1996). See also Florida Bar re Webster, 647 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1994) (petition for reinstatement denied due to “misrepresentation by omission”). | 442 In Feinberg, 760 So. 2d at 938, the cou