Epstein Secrets

Intervene of Roy Black, Martin Weinberg, and Jay Lefkowitz [DE 78] at 6. Second, also in opposing the intervention of attorneys Black, Weinberg, and Lefkowtiz, the plaintiffs argued that "[o]nly Epstein has an interest in the validity of the non-prosecution agreement . . . ." Jane Doe I and Jane Doe 2's R

ment of inconvenience does not go far because many of the issues raised by Mr. Epstein parallel the issues raised by attorneys Black, Weinberg, and Letkowitz as well as those raised during the August 12, 2011 hearing, and Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 do not have to file their responsive pleadings addressing

ment 93 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/02/2011 Page 3 of 9 First, they argued in their opposition to the intervention of attorneys Black, Weinberg, and Lefkowitz that Mr. Epstein "is the real party in interest" and that "harm from the release of the materials (if any) could be only to Jeffrey Epstein." Jane D

materials (if any) could be only to Jeffrey Epstein." Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2's Response To Motion To Intervene of Roy Black, Martin Weinberg, and Jay Lefkowitz [DE 78] at 6. Second, also in opposing the intervention of attorneys Black, Weinberg, and Lefkowtiz, the plaintiffs argued that "[o]nly Epstein has

ng principle that "[t]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large part to the separation of powers doctrine. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Whether to investigate po

/JOHNSON JANE DOE I and JANE DOE 2, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. MOTION TO INTERVENE OF ROY BLACK, MARTIN WEINBERC, AND JAY LEFKOWITZ This is a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) by attorneys Roy Black, Martin Weinberg, and Jay Lefkowitz, to intervene for the

INTERVENE OF ROY BLACK, MARTIN WEINBERC, AND JAY LEFKOWITZ This is a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civ

omcyJ ay Lefkowitz within the next few days, as soon as a certificate of good standing from the New York Bar arrives. Attorneys Black, Weinberg and Lcfkowitz do not seek intervention to litigate whether the Crime Victims' Rights Act was violated and if so, against whom a remedy is appropriate. Instead, t

g principle that It]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large pan to the separation of powers doctrine — prosecutors are delegates of the President, helping him

DOE 1 and JANE DOE 2, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING OF INTERVENORS ROY BLACK, MARTIN WEINBERG, AND JAY LEFKOWITZ IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDER CONCERNING PRODUCTION, USE, AND DISCLOSURE OF PLEA NEGOTIATIONS During the hearing on August 12,

INTERVENORS ROY BLACK, MARTIN WEINBERG, AND JAY LEFKOWITZ IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION FOR A PROTECTIVE ORDE

principle that "[t]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large part to the separation of powers doctrine. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. Whether to investigate po

1300 Miami. Florida 33131 By /S/ ROY BLACK, ESQ. Florida Bar No. JACKIE PERCZEK, ESQ. Florida Bar No. On Behalf of Intervenors Roy Black and Jay Lefkowitz MARTIN G. WEINBERG, P.C. 20 Park Plaza Suite 1000 Boston, MA 02116 By /S/ MARTIN G. WEINBERG, ESQ. Massachusetts Bar No. 519480 On Behalf of

No. On Behalf of Intervenors Roy Black and Jay Lefkowitz MARTIN G. WEINBERG, P.C. 20 Park Plaza Suite 1

principle that "[t]he Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation's criminal laws." United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large part to the separation of powers doctrine — prosecutors are delegates of the President, helping him

ed States Attorney's Office, Miami, FL. For Roy Black, Intervenor: Jacqueline Perczek, Roy Eric Black, Black Srebnick Kornspan & Stumpf, Miami, FL; Jay P. Lefkowitz, PRO HAC VICE, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, New York, NY; Martin G. Weinberg, PRO HAC VICE, Martin G. Weinberg, P.C., Boston, MA. For Martin G. Weinberg,

ck Srebnick Kornspan & Stumpf, Miami, FL; Jay P. Lefkowitz, PRO HAC VICE, Kirkland & Ellis, LLP, New York,

nalysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 134 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1996) (Judicial deference [94] to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of

there was this—that he had one meeting with Jay Lefkowitz, a member of Jeffrey Epstein's powerhouse, massiv

76642 VICKY WARD: If Alexander Acosta had let the FBI to continue with its investigation. But instead, there was this—that he had one meeting with Jay Lefkowitz, a member of Jeffrey Epstein's powerhouse, massive sort of legal team, and he did the—you know, he later justified the plea deal that was cut, the n

d "some evidence tending to show the existence" of the essential elements of a due process violation. Id., ECF No. 37 at 5 (quoting United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996)). The government pointed to a standard typically applied in suppression cases—i.e., that discovery is appropriate only "i

led "Rsrch re Crime Victims Rights" containing attorney research, handwritten notes, draft victim notification letter, and draft correspondence to Jay Lefkowitz (Also contains a November 28 2007 letter from Kenneth Starr to , and a November 29, 2007 letter from Jay Lefkowitz to R. Alexander Acosta (P-010

Thru P-009125 12/6/2007 Letter from to Jay P. Lefkowitz re Jeffrey Epstein (victim notification) [pursua

analysis necessary to assess the "strength of the case" for or against any particular prosecution. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (Judicial deference to prosecutors' decisions "rests in part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors a

ng down, we just want to get a final blessing.” Negotiations continued throughout the day on Wednesday, September 19, 2007, with Villafaña and Lefkowitz exchanging emails regarding the factual proffer for a plea and the scheduling of a meeting to finalize the plea agreement’s terms. During that exc

deputy and with whom he had socialized. Later, when Epstein was seeking Acosta’s personal involvement in the case, Epstein hired Kenneth Starr and Jay Lefkowitz, prominent attorneys from Kirkland & Ellis with whom Acosta was acquainted from his previous employment with that firm. Villafaña told OPR that s

esident’s delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting U.S. Const. art. II, § 3). Unless based on an impermissible standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary

atts-that4ane-Dee-1-ancl4ane-Dee-2-alrea ma . confidemiel,Mr. Epstein adopts all the arguments advanced by proposed intervenors Black, Weinberg, and Lefkowitz in their motion to intervene and its attached motion for a protective order [DE 56], as well as during the August 12, 2011 hearing. EFTA00301857

his chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction"); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 807 (11th Cir. 2000). Thus, the only real purpose in seeking the plea negotiatio

e Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 already have remain confidential. Mr. Epstein adopts all the arguments advanced by proposed intervenors Black, Weinberg, and Lefkowitz in their motion to intervene and its attached motion for a protective order [DE 56), as well as during the August 12, 2011 hearing. In further sup

principle that [title Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion to enforce the Nation s criminal laws. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). This is due in large part to the separation of powers doctrine. Id.; U.S. Const. art. II, K 3. Whether to investigate