Epstein Secrets

rs into the invasion, he moved an armored force toward Kuwait’s border with Saudi Arabia, a key US regional ally, immediately prompting the President George Bush’s administration to go beyond mere verbal condemnation. With Saudi agreement, Washington dispatched a squadron of F-15s to the kingdom — the first step

ave to attack military action. I was sent to Washington along with Misha and David Ivri, a former air force commander, to deliver that message to the Bush administration. From the first days after Saddam’s attack on Kuwait, 236 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011707 I’d been impressed by President Bush’s political ac

236 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011707 I’d been impressed by President Bush’s political acumen in assembling an international

had been in charge of the simulation exercise in the Airya, predicting how Arik’s ostensibly more limited invasion plan would inevitably develop into Big Pines. Even as we were talking, 201 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011672 another Israeli unit broke through to the Beirut-Damascus road. On the far side of Lebanon’s c

rs into the invasion, he moved an armored force toward Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia, a key US regional ally, immediately prompting the President George Bush's administration to go beyond mere verbal condemnation. With Saudi agreement, Washington dispatched a squadron of F-15s to the kingdom - the first step

ave to attack military action. I was sent to Washington along with Misha and David Ivri, a former air force commander, to deliver that message to the Bush administration. From the first days after Saddam's attack on Kuwait, 236 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028084 I'd been impressed by President Bush's political ac

36 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028084 I'd been impressed by President Bush's political acumen in assembling an international

had been in charge of the simulation exercise in the kirya, predicting how Arik's ostensibly more limited invasion plan would inevitably develop into Big Pines. Even as we were talking, 201 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028049 another Israeli unit broke through to the Beirut-Damascus road. On the far side of Lebanon's c

in groups of three or four in a thin line stretching 200 or 300 yards on either side of us. They were lying behind whatever cover they could find: a bush, a clump of debris, a small rise in the sand. Some were firing. Others were wounded. From just a few yards away, Egyptian infantrymen were raking the

This wasn’t mere supposition on my part. In February 1982, we ran a simulation exercise in the kirya based on Plan B. The result: Little Pines became Big Pines. A clash with the Syrians proved inevitable, if only because one target even under Little Pines was the main road between Beirut and Damascus. It lay

in groups of three or four in a thin line stretching 200 or 300 yards on either side of us. They were lying behind whatever cover they could find: a bush, a clump of debris, a small rise in the sand. Some were firing. Others were wounded From just a few yards away, Egyptian infantrymen were raking them

This wasn't mere supposition on my part. In February 1982, we ran a simulation exercise in the kirya based on Plan B. The result: Little Pines became Big Pines. A clash with the Syrians proved inevitable, if only because one target even under Little Pines was the main road between Beirut and Damascus. It lay