Epstein Secrets

rs into the invasion, he moved an armored force toward Kuwait’s border with Saudi Arabia, a key US regional ally, immediately prompting the President George Bush’s administration to go beyond mere verbal condemnation. With Saudi agreement, Washington dispatched a squadron of F-15s to the kingdom — the first step

ave to attack military action. I was sent to Washington along with Misha and David Ivri, a former air force commander, to deliver that message to the Bush administration. From the first days after Saddam’s attack on Kuwait, 236 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011707 I’d been impressed by President Bush’s political ac

236 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011707 I’d been impressed by President Bush’s political acumen in assembling an international

us into a small room in the bunker reserved for use by the Defense Minister. As Foreign Minister, I was the only cabinet member with him — along with Uri Savir, Peres’s senior deputy for peace negotiations and several other Peres aides. If there had been a discussion, I would have told him that as long as he

rs into the invasion, he moved an armored force toward Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia, a key US regional ally, immediately prompting the President George Bush's administration to go beyond mere verbal condemnation. With Saudi agreement, Washington dispatched a squadron of F-15s to the kingdom - the first step

ave to attack military action. I was sent to Washington along with Misha and David Ivri, a former air force commander, to deliver that message to the Bush administration. From the first days after Saddam's attack on Kuwait, 236 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028084 I'd been impressed by President Bush's political ac

36 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028084 I'd been impressed by President Bush's political acumen in assembling an international

us into a small room in the bunker reserved for use by the Defense Minister. As Foreign Minister, I was the only cabinet member with him - along with Uri Savir, Peres's senior deputy for peace negotiations and several other Peres aides. If there had been a discussion, I would have told him that as long as he

Strip (5 October 1999) 363 Sharon Address at Fourth Herzliya Conference (18 December 2003) 371 Exchange of Letters between PM Sharon and President Bush (14 April 2004) 376 Disengagement Plan: General Outline (18 April 2004) 381 Rice-Weisglass Letter of Understanding (18 April 2004) 387 Letters from

3) 371 Exchange of Letters between PM Sharon and President Bush (14 April 2004) 376 Disengagement Plan: General

est to Yossi Beilin, then Deputy Foreign Minister. Shortly afterwards, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres dispatched the Director General of the ministry, Uri Savir, and the head of the ministry’s legal department, Joel Singer, to Oslo. The Norwegians had, until then, seen the secret talks in Oslo and their poten

ptember 2000 signaled the second Palestinian uprising. This reduced the room for maneuver for the Palestinian negotiators. Following the election of George W. Bush as President of the United States, and against the backdrop of the new Intifada, Palestinian and Israeli negotiators gathered in HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_023