Epstein Secrets

rs into the invasion, he moved an armored force toward Kuwait’s border with Saudi Arabia, a key US regional ally, immediately prompting the President George Bush’s administration to go beyond mere verbal condemnation. With Saudi agreement, Washington dispatched a squadron of F-15s to the kingdom — the first step

ave to attack military action. I was sent to Washington along with Misha and David Ivri, a former air force commander, to deliver that message to the Bush administration. From the first days after Saddam’s attack on Kuwait, 236 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011707 I’d been impressed by President Bush’s political ac

236 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_011707 I’d been impressed by President Bush’s political acumen in assembling an international

steps removed from what was happening on the ground. But everyone involved shared responsibility for the failures — including the overall commanders: Yanoush, and me as well. That weight felt even heavier because the tragedy occurred only hours before our own force’s involvement in the Lebanon War was ove

rs into the invasion, he moved an armored force toward Kuwait's border with Saudi Arabia, a key US regional ally, immediately prompting the President George Bush's administration to go beyond mere verbal condemnation. With Saudi agreement, Washington dispatched a squadron of F-15s to the kingdom - the first step

ave to attack military action. I was sent to Washington along with Misha and David Ivri, a former air force commander, to deliver that message to the Bush administration. From the first days after Saddam's attack on Kuwait, 236 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028084 I'd been impressed by President Bush's political ac

36 HOUSE _OVERSIGHT_028084 I'd been impressed by President Bush's political acumen in assembling an international

steps removed from what was happening on the ground. But everyone involved shared responsibility for the failures - including the overall commanders: Yanoush, and me as well. That weight felt even heavier because the tragedy occurred only hours before our own force's involvement in the Lebanon War was over

in groups of three or four in a thin line stretching 200 or 300 yards on either side of us. They were lying behind whatever cover they could find: a bush, a clump of debris, a small rise in the sand. Some were firing. Others were wounded. From just a few yards away, Egyptian infantrymen were raking the

ough any resistance and reach the Beirut-Damascus road. But after the Bekaa air battle, and the most serious air losses for an Arab state since 1967, Yanoush and I knew that international pressure for a cease-fire would quickly escalate. Aware we were racing against the clock, we began a co-ordinated push

in groups of three or four in a thin line stretching 200 or 300 yards on either side of us. They were lying behind whatever cover they could find: a bush, a clump of debris, a small rise in the sand. Some were firing. Others were wounded From just a few yards away, Egyptian infantrymen were raking them

ough any resistance and reach the Beirut-Damascus road. But after the Bekaa air battle, and the most serious air losses for an Arab state since 1967, Yanoush and I knew that international pressure for a cease-fire would quickly escalate. Aware we were racing against the clock, we began a co-ordinated push