Epstein Secrets

the issues and the defenses in the litigation"). W. The information simply falls under the "highly pr

to embody a general federal policy against indiscriminate disclosure of tax returns from any source. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Coro. v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 514-15 (N.D. III. 1972X"it is the opinion of this court that (§6103] reflect[s] a valid public policy against disclosure of income tax returns. This

t 1349 (quoting Douglas Oil Co... Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 223 (1979)). Whether proceeding u

ket 07/06/2015 Page 12 of 51 if they were created by or for a party to the subsequent litigation," Underwriters Ins. Co. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 248 F.R.D. 663,668 (N.D. Ga. 2008). These cases rely on the Supreme Court's dicta in Federal Trade Communication I. Grolier, Inc., that "the literal language o

been found, the party whose tax return information has been requested has the burden to "provide alternative sources for this sensitive information. W. If the requested information is available from alternate sources, disclosure should not be compelled. Potential alternate sources to which the cour

to embody a general federal policy against indiscriminate disclosure of tax returns from any source. Federal Say. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 514-15 (N.D. Ill. 1972X"it is the opinion of this court that [§6103] reflect[s] a valid public policy against disclosure of income tax returns. This

so ordered. New York, NY April 4.5"; 2016 7 T W. SWEET U.S.D.J. EFTA_R1_00012013 EFTA01734223

l defense interest, which cloaks related communications in privilege, and a common problem, to which the privilege does not apply. Cgiazaryan, 290 F.R.D. at 434 (citing Finkeiman v. Klaus, 2007 WL 4303538, at *4 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. Nov. 28, 2007)). "IA] limited common purpose (that) necessitates disclosure"

protective order, entered by the late Hon. Robert W. Sweet in a civil defamation action, Giuffre v. M

is more difficult to show a party reasonably relied on a blanket order in producing documents or submitting to a deposition.' Id. (quoting EPDM, 255 F.R.D. at 319). The second factor—the language of the Protective Order itself-similarly weighs in favor of modification. The Protective Order provided tha

decision of the district court. AFFIRMED David W. TROEDEL, Petitioner-Appellee, Cross-Appellant,

vernment is required to demonstrate that there are grounds for a hearing under the specific provisions of either 3142(f)(1) or (f)(2)." Butler, 165 F.R.D. at 71. "When there exists one or more grounds for holding a hearing under those provisions, the government may proceed on the theory of risk of fli

1349 (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops N.W., 441 U.S. 211, 223 (1979)). Whether proceeding u

07/06/2015 Page 12 of 51 if they were created by or for a party to the subsequent litigation," Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 248 F.R.D. 663,668 (N.D. Ga. 2008). These cases rely on the Supreme Court's dicta in Federal Trade Communication v. Grolier, Inc., that "the literal language o

08- 80469 Robert C. Josefsberg, Esq. Katherine W. Ezell, Esq. Podhurst Orseck, P.A. 25 West Hagle

ere, preventing Epstein from identifying Plaintiffs' in subpoenas and other type discovery overwhelmingly inhibits discovery. Ees Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. at 176 (E.D. P.A. 2001) (denying protective order where alleged sexual assault victim did not demonstrate a serious specific injury and allowing De

ers' website. Holdings: The District Court, Paul W. Grimm, United States Magistrate Judge, held tha

to Orig. US Gov. Works. https://web2.westlaw.contrint/printstream.aspers=WLW11.07&pbc=8C6E23F9,Sidecti n ObAPIAI EFTA00177915 Page 10 of 25 183 F.R.D. 458,51 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 35 (Cite as: 183 F.R.D. 458) L . way that the attorney client priv- ilege can. Whether the information involved is fac