Epstein Secrets

ng a text in a way that makes part of it redundant," Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon that "where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning ... in the law of thi

where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment." After (but not before) the original statute of limitations had expired, a party such as Stogner was not "liable to any punishment." California's new statute therefore "aggravated" Stogner's alleged crime, or made it "greater than it was, when

ention of the Er Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stogner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex crimes that he allegedly committed between 1955 and 1973. While the original three-year statute of l

ng a text in a way that makes part of it redundant," Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon that "where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning ... in the law of thi

where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment." After (but not before) the original statute of limitations had expired, a party such as Stogner was not "liable to any punishment." California's new statute therefore "aggravated" Stogner's alleged crime, or made it "greater than it was, when

ention of the Er Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stogner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex crimes that he allegedly committed between 1955 and 1973. While the original three-year statute of l

ng a text in a way that makes part of it redundant," Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon that "where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning ... in the law of thi

where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment." After (but not before) the original statute of limitations had expired, a party such as Stogner was not "liable to any punishment." California's new statute therefore "aggravated" Stogner's alleged crime, or made it "greater than it was, when

ention of the Er Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stogner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex crimes that he allegedly committed between 1955 and 1973. While the original three-year statute of l

ng a text in a way that makes part of it redundant," Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon that "where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning ... in the law of thi

where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment." After (but not before) the original statute of limitations had expired, a party such as Stogner was not "liable to any punishment." California's new statute therefore "aggravated" Stogner's alleged crime, or made it "greater than it was, when

ention of the Er Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stogner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex crimes that he allegedly committed between 1955 and 1973. While the original three-year statute of l

ng a text in a way that makes part of it redundant," Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon that "where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning ... in the law of thi

where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment." After (but not before) the original statute of limitations had expired, a party such as Stogner was not "liable to any punishment." California's new statute therefore "aggravated" Stogner's alleged crime, or made it "greater than it was, when

ention of the Er Post Facto clause. The Supreme Court's decision in California v. Stogner, 539 U.S. 607 (2003), perfectly illustrates the point. In Stogner, the defendant was charged in 1998 based on sex crimes that he allegedly committed between 1955 and 1973. While the original three-year statute of l

eading a text in a way that makes part of it redundant," Nat'l Ass'n of Home BuildersI, Defenders of Wildlife 551 U.S. 644 (2007) (citing TRW Inc. Andrews 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)), and the canon that "where words are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning ... in the law of this

where the party was not, by law, liable to any punishment." After (but not before) the original statute of limitations had expired, a party such as Stogner was not "liable to any punishment." California's new statute therefore "aggravated" Stogner's alleged crime, or made it "greater than it was, when

Post Facto clause precludes the revival of claims predicated on past crimes. The precise concerns animating Stogner are present in this case. As in Stogner Defendant was "liable to punishment" under § 2255 before Plaintiff turned 18, but once she attained that age, he no was longer "liable to punishmen

orney Alex] Acosta, [Former USAO-SDFL supervisor Andrew] Lourie, or Villafaiia agreed to the nonprosecut

1) 109, 113 viii EFTA00099949 Silver, 15 Cr. 93 (VEC) 275 Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (KMW) 275 Smith y. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) 117, 118 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) 45 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) 300 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) 299,300 Taylor v. U

hild Exploitation and Obscenity Section ("CEOS"), Andrew Oosterbaan, during the investigation and plea di

01) 109, 113 viii EFTA00077614 Silver, 15 Cr. 93 (VEC) 275 Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (KMW) 275 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) 117, 118 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) 45 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) 300 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) 299, 300 Taylor v.

hild Exploitation and Obscenity Section ("CEOS"), Andrew Oosterbaan, during the investigation and plea di

01) 109, 113 viii EFTA00039429 Silver, 15 Cr. 93 (VEC) 275 Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (KMW) 275 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) 117, 118 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) 45 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) 300 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) 299, 300 Taylor v.

hild Exploitation and Obscenity Section ("CEOS"), Andrew Oosterbaan, during the investigation and plea di

1) 109, 113 viii EFTA00103007 Silver, 15 Cr. 93 (VEC) 275 Skelos, 15 Cr. 317 (KMW) 275 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) 117, 118 Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) 45 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) 300 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) 299, 300 Taylor v.