Epstein Secrets

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. I 1 th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowin

e travel. In other words, the Government must show that the Defendant's criminal purpose was not merely incidental to the travel. United States v. Hoschouer, F.3d,_, 2007 WL 979931, *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007). The decision of the Eleventh Circuit was consistent with every other circuit that has addres

e travel. In other words, the Government must show that the Defendant's criminal purpose was not merely incidental to the travel. United States v. Hoschouer , F.3d 2007 WL 979931, *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007). The decision of the Eleventh Circuit was consistent with every other circuit that has addresse

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

e travel. In other words, the Government must show that the Defendant's criminal purpose was not merely incidental to the travel. United States v. Hoschouer , F.3d 2007 WL 979931, *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007). The decision of the Eleventh Circuit was consistent with every other circuit that has addresse

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

e travel. In other words, the Government must show that the Defendant's criminal purpose was not merely incidental to the travel. United States v. Hoschouer , F.3d 2007 WL 979931, *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2007). The decision of the Eleventh Circuit was consistent with every other circuit that has addresse

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing