Epstein Secrets

Memorandum SubjectDate Re: Operation Leap Year April 17, 2007 ToFrom R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney Jeff Sloman. First Assistant United States Attorney W , Chief, Criminal Division , MAUSA, Northern

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

Memorandum SubjectDate Re: Operation Leap Year April 30, 2007 ToFrom R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney Jeff Sloman. First Assistant United States Attorney M a, Chief, Criminal Division MAUSA, Northern Reg

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

Memorandum SubjectDate Re: Operation Leap Year May I, 2007 (Revised 9/13/07) (2nd Revision 2/19/08) a ToFrom R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney Jeff Sloman, First Assistant United States Attorney M, Chief, Criminal Division MAUSA, Northern Reg

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

Memorandum SubjectDate Re: Operation Leap Year (Revised 9/13/07) ToFrom R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney Jeff Sloman, First Assistant United States Attorney M, Chief, Criminal Division MAUSA, Northern Reg

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

Memorandum SubjectDate Re: Operation Leap Year April 23, 2007 ToFrom R. Alexander Acosta, United States Attorney Jeff Sloman. First Assistant United States Attorney M, I Chief, Criminal Division MAUSA, Northern R

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s