Epstein Secrets

er agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Elevent

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

er agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Elevent

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical worth used in different parts of the same act are in

her sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are int

ver agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Eleven

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

er agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Elevent

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

er agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Elevent

ther sections of the Mann Act shows that Congress likewise did not intend to require proof of knowledge of age to violate those sections either. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc. , 513 U.S. 561, 570 (1995) (noting the "normal rule of statutory construction" that "identical words used in different parts of the same act are in

er agent's cellular telephone. Although both the defendant and the agent were in Georgia, the signals to the agent's cell phone had to pass through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center. The defendant argued that he did not know or intend that the call pass in interstate commerce. The Elevent