Epstein Secrets

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. I 1 th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowin

ctivity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove that

activity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove tha

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

activity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove tha

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing

activity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove tha

e that the defendant "knowingly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowing