Epstein Secrets

activity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove tha

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

activity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove tha

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

al activity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. United States I. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove that

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

ly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e., that he intended to commit the crime. I 1 th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

ctivity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove that

activity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove tha

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

activity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove tha

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s

activity must have not been merely incidental to the trip. United States v. Hayward, 359 F.3d 631, 637-38 (3d Cir. 2004). See also United States v. Garcia-Lopez , 234 F.3d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 2000) (The district court did not err in instructing the jury that "it was sufficient for the Government to prove tha

ngly and willfully intended to commit the offense" — i.e. , that he intended to commit the crime. 11th Cir. Pattern Jury Instr., Special Instr. 11 ("Attempt(s)") (2003). Where, as here, the offense is completed, the statutory language requires only that the defendant knowingly persuade, induce, or entice s