Epstein Secrets

ourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's use of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90

ngress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not c

ourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's use of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90

ngress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not c

ourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's use of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90

ngress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not c

ourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's use of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90

ngress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not c

ourts addressing § 2423(b) have relied on longstanding case law interpreting the Mann Act's use of the statutory phrase. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Lopez, 234 F.3d 217, 220 n.3 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. yang, 128 F.3d 1065, 1069-70 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 389-90

ngress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not c