Epstein Secrets

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

ngress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not c

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

ngress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not c

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

ngress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not c

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

ngress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not c

statute applies only if the defendant's dominant motive for interstate travel was to engage in unlawful sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Tvkarsky, 446 F.3d 458, 471 (3d Cir. 2006) ("[T]he government must show that the criminal sexual act was a dominant purpose of the trip, not a merely incide

ngress has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'" Id. (quoting Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). In this case, however, the Court need not take anything "as given." Even if the statute's language were not c