Epstein Secrets

Stables , 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley v. Marathon Oil Co. , 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman v. Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc. , 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the assertion must be made on a question-by-question a

ers that are the subject of this motion, but Epstein had already removed the computers from the home. ( See Recarey Declaration.) FlAs explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a ba

I Stables , 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley I Marathon Oil Co. , 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman I Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc. , 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the assertion must be made on a question-by-question a

ers that are the subject of this motion, but Epstein had already removed the computers from the home. ( See Recarey Declaration.) FlAs explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a ba

. Stables, 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman v. Brauvin Realty AdvisorS, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the assertion must be made on a question-by-question an

rposes of Doe, and, thus, the subpoenas are enforceable (regardless of the computers' contents). Id. at 93-94 (citation omitted)." "As explained in the Ex Parte Affidavits, the United States has established that it can authenticate the computers without Riley's testimony. Even if it could not, however, that is not a b