Epstein Secrets

Stables , 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley v. Marathon Oil Co. , 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman v. Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc. , 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the assertion must be made on a question-by-question a

"Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charge

I Stables , 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley I Marathon Oil Co. , 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman I Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc. , 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the assertion must be made on a question-by-question a

"Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some other courts: have read into McNeil 's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are `factually related' to a charge

. Stables, 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman v. Brauvin Realty AdvisorS, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the assertion must be made on a question-by-question an

e "Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions." Id. at 167 (quoting McNeil at 175). The Cobb Court noted that some -34- EFTA00179133 other courts: have read into McNeil's offense-specific definition an exception for crimes that are 'factually