Epstein Secrets

tion of criminal evidence that forecloses [the defendant's] attorney-client privilege argument . . ." Id. The district court addressed the cases of Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), and People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Clutchette, the defendant's attorney had sent an inve

ry to the ability of Epstein's counsel to evaluate their significance; copies of the hard drives could have been made. Of course, unlike counsel in Clutchette and Meredith, Epstein's counsel never provided the evidence to law enforcement and, instead, tries to aver that the items may not exist. If that is

or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an -18- EFTA00179117 attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over fact

tion of criminal evidence that forecloses [the defendant's] attorney-client privilege argument . . ." Id. The district court addressed the cases of Clutchette v. Rushen , 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), and People v. Meredith , 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Clutchette , the defendant's attorney had sent an in

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Co

The district court addressed the cases of Clutchette I Rushen , 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), and People I Meredith , 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Clutchette , the defendant's attorney had sent an investigator to collect incriminating evidence from a shopkeeper, and the trial court had allowed that eviden

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn I United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Cou

The district court addressed the cases of Clutchette I Rushen , 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985), and People I Meredith , 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981). In Clutchette , the defendant's attorney had sent an investigator to collect incriminating evidence from a shopkeeper, and the trial court had allowed that eviden

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn I United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Cou