Epstein Secrets

episode, are separate offenses for Sixth Amendment purposes. The reason is that each prosecution involves separate sovereigns."); United States v. McCloud , F. Supp. 2d 2007 WL 1706353 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2007) (same). Even if Epstein could assert a Sixth Amendment violation based upon the issuance o

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Co

l episode, are separate offenses for Sixth Amendment purposes. The reason is that each prosecution involves separate sovereigns."); United States I McCloud , F. Supp. 2d 2007 WL 1706353 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2007) (same). Even if Epstein could assert a Sixth Amendment violation based upon the issuance o

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn I United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Cou

l episode, are separate offenses for Sixth Amendment purposes. The reason is that each prosecution involves separate sovereigns."); United States v. McCloud, F. Supp. 2d , 2007 WL 1706353 (S.D. Ga. June 11, 2007) (same). Even if Epstein could assert a Sixth Amendment violation based upon the issuance

or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an -18- EFTA00179117 attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over fact