Epstein Secrets

. 325, 337 (1985). Likewise, whether a subpoena is oppressive depends on the context. In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury , 854E Supp. 1392, 1401 (S.D. Ind. 1993). The context here is the wholesale removal of these computers just days before a court authorized a warrant for their seizure. The context of

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Co

. 325, 337 (1985). Likewise, whether a subpoena is oppressive depends on the context. In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury , 854E Supp. 1392, 1401 (S.D. Ind. 1993). The context here is the wholesale removal of these computers just days before a court authorized a warrant for their seizure. The context of

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn I United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Cou

325, 337 (1985). Likewise, whether a subpoena is oppressive depends on the context. In re August, 1993 Regular Grand Jury, 854 F. Supp. 1392, 1401 (S.D. Ind. 1993). The context here is the wholesale removal of these computers just days before a court authorized a warrant for their seizure. The context of

or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an -18- EFTA00179117 attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over fact