Epstein Secrets

ents , are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns - specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repre

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Co

ents , are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns - specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense-specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repre

s or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn I United States , 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over factual matters. The Cou

lements, are separate offenses for purposes of the Sixth Amendment because they were violations of the laws of two separate sovereigns—specifically the State of Mississippi and the United States. Therefore, because the Sixth Amendment is offense- specific, Avants's statements during the 1967 interview, when he was repres

or that the computers contain attorney-client communications, nor were the computers or their contents produced in anticipation of litigation. In Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981), the Supreme Court made clear that an -18- EFTA00179117 attorney cannot create a "zone of silence" over fact