Epstein Secrets

noz , 233 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2000); Hawkins v. Stables , 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley v. Marathon Oil Co. , 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman v. Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc. , 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the a

the computers. In particular, Epstein has not showed that the "communication" was confidential. Even if Riley could stand in the shoes of Attorney Black, Epstein has not shown that the removal of the computers from Epstein's home was done in confidence. If others wer present, there was an implied waiver of th

ulloz , 233 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2000); Hawkins I Stables , 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley I Marathon Oil Co. , 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman I Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc. , 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the as

the computers. In particular, Epstein has not showed that the "communication" was confidential. Even if Riley could stand in the shoes of Attorney Black, Epstein has not shown that the removal of the computers from Epstein's home was done in confidence. If others wer present, there was an implied waiver of th

Mutioz, 233 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2000); Hawkins v. Stables, 148 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 1998); Motley v. Marathon Oil Co., 71 F.3d 1547 (10th Cir. 1995); Christman v. Brauvin Realty AdvisorS, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. III. 1999). In making that showing, blanket assertions of the privilege are not proper—the a

the computers. In particular, Epstein has not showed that the "communication" was confidential. Even if Riley could stand in the shoes of Attorney Black, Epstein has not shown that the removal of the computers from Epstein's home was done in confidence. If others wer present, there was an implied waiver of t