Epstein Secrets

in which having a different behavior than one's partner produces a higher payoff. Doves cooperate by sharing resources but retreat when challenged. Hawks do not cooperate. They are ready to fight to avoid leaving an interaction empty-handed. A Hawk gets the entire resource when facing a Dove but suff

covered numerous situations in which cooperative or otherwise helping behaviors are detrimental t0 the individual or selectively disad- vantageous (Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Mesterton-Gibbons. 2000; Cressman, 2005; Schecter and Gintis, 2016). It has been shown using a variety of models that such behav

14 6.2 Mixed games with 2 strategies 119 6.3 Mixed games with two pure strategies 122 6.3.1 A resealed payoff matrix 125 6.3.2 Example: Hawks and Doves 126 6.4 A mixed 3-game: Cooperators, Defectors, Loners 130 6.5 Mixed games with n pure strategies 135 6.6 Conclusion 136 B

uction can be genetic or cultural. The traditional approach to evolutionary game theory is based on the replicator equation (Taylor & .Jonker 1978, Hofbauer et al 1979, Zeeman 1980, Hofbauer & Sigmund 1988,1998, 2003, Cressman 2003), which examines deterministic dynamics in infinitely large, well-mixed

. 0, the mixed phase extends to the quarter-plane a > 0, > 0. For large mutation ratesµ —• co, however, the mixed phase disappears. 6.3.2 Example: Hawks and Doves As an example, we consider the Hawk-Dove game (Maynard-Smith 1982, Houston Mcishunara 1988, Houston Sc McNamara 1991, IvIesterton-Gibbons

es over it (Nowak & Sigmund 2004). The classical approach to evolutionary game dynamics is based on the replicator equation (Taylor Sc Jonker 1978, Hofbauer et at 1979, Zeeman 1980, Hofbauer & Sigmund 1988, 1998). The population is well-mixed and infinitely large. Any two individuals are equally likely t